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Dear Goverrior McKernan:
On November 3, Maine voters will decide if Maine Yankee
should be allowed to continue to operate. This marks the third
time that Maine voters are being asked to decide the fate of the
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant.
Because of the importance of
this decision, you have asked us to review, update, and expand
upon the findings of the 1986 Maine Yankee Shutdown Assessment.
We have found the 1986 study to be essentially sound. This
work expands upon the 1986 report by updating the discussion of
legal issues posed by the referendum and by extending the
analysis of economic and environmental issues. Our work benefits
from events and research subsequent to 1986 including:
judicial decisions, such as the First Lutheran case decided
this June by the U.S. Supreme Court;
the proposed Central Maine Power power purchase from Hydro
Quebec and our subsequent analysis of it;
proposals for competitive domestic power production
submitted to Central Maine Power in response to their
solicitation; and
analysis of the April 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear
power station in the Soviet Union.
A decision regarding a state-mandated shutdown of Maine
Yankee raises the question of State authority to effect such a
shutdown. While it is always very difficult to predict how a
court will rule on federal preemption, as with the 1986 report,
we find it highly unlikely that a State law closing a nuclear
plant due to waste disposal and safety concerns could withstand
judicial review. A 1983 Supreme Court decision f£rmly upheld
federal authority in the entire field of nuclear safety concerns.
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The higher cost of replacement power, estimatd to be $779
million (present value) over the period 1989-2015, will raise
electricity rates in Maine by between 5 and 10% statewide. This
rate effect would vary around the State,, however.
Rates in
Aroostook County_would be most affected because of its heavier
dependence on Maine Yankee as a source of power.
In fact, rates
in Aroostook County could increase by between 8 and 20% between
1989 and 2008.
Lower dependency on Maine Yankee will moderate
rat~ imp~~~n. .the Ce~tral Maine Power and Bangor Hydro Electric
reg1ons, R · · ;· . hem 1n the 5 to 9% range.
But I must strongly
emphasize that thi
· ct one component of the total cost of a
shutdo'wn. Maine taxpayers will have to bear the cost of any
compensation determined to be owed to the owners of Maine Yankee.
Closing Maine Yankee in 1988, 20 years ahead of its
scheduled retirement, would affect the Maine economy in several
ways.
First, increased electric rates will raise production
costs of Maine businesses and reduce disposable income of Maine
households. We have estimated that replacing Maine Yankee power
will add $779 million (present value) to energy costs in Maine
between 1989 and 2015.
Second, the cost of any compensation due the owners of Maine
Yankee, possibly over $1 billion, would be borne by Maine
taxpayers, further reducing their income and draining capital
from the State.
Finally, the Town of Wiscasset and surrounding
communities would experience the loss of a major employer and
taxpayer.
The need for replacement power may offset some of the
economic costs of a mandatory shutdown.
Replacing Maine Yankee
entirely with domestic power could create up to 1600 jobs and
generate $575 million in income (present value).
However, the
net effect of these economic impacts is to reduce income in Maine
by $1.38 billion and permanently eliminate 1390 jobs between 1989
and 2008.
The principal benefit to be derived from an early shutdown
of Maine Yankee would be the elimination of the risk of a
catastrophic operations accident at the Wiscasset facility.
The
April 1986 accident at the Soviet Union's Chernobyl nuclear power
station has heightened public concerns regarding the safety of
nuclear power in general.
While closing Maine Yankee eliminates the threats associated
with an operating nuclear plant, those associated with
decommissioning and waste disposal remain.
The outcome of the
referendum will have no impact on the selection of Maine as a
high-level nuclear waste site.
We can find no connection between
the production of nuclear waste at Maine Yankee and the site
selection process established by the Department of Energy.
Moreover, sources of replacement power--biomass, hydro, oil and
Canadian imports--will, themselves, pose significant

environmental and health threats.
Comparing the risk and consequences of a catastrophic
accident against the economics of increased energy costs presents
a formidable challenge. Quantifying the economic costs of an
early shutdown, as presented here, is an effort to put this
complex issue into perspective. As noted in this report, the
actual costs of replacing Maine Yankee could vary considerably
from these estimates. Of particular importance to the costs of
replacing Maine Yankee are the price of replacement power, the
actual cost of operating Maine Yankee over the next 20 years, and
the basis upon which the owners of the facility will be
compensated, if compensation is required.
Whatever the costs of closing Maine Yankee, a vote to shut
down the plant will have an impact on the lives of every Maine
citizen.
It is crucial that a decision so critical to our future
be based upon as clear an understanding of its consequences as
possible.
It is my hope that this study adds to a clearer
understanding of the issues surrounding an early shutdown of
Maine Yankee. Thank you for the opportunity to serve you and the
people of Maine in this complex issue.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

On November 3, Maine voters will be asked to decide whether Maine
Yankee, or any other high-level nuclear waste producing facility, should be
allowed to operate in this State, or whether Maine Yankee should be closed
before its scheduled shutdown in 2008. Because of the important implications
of this decision, Governor John R. McKernan, Jr. directed the State Planning
Office with the assistance of the Office of Energy Resources, Public Advocate,
and the Advocacy Staff of the Public Utilities Commission, to examine the legal
and technical constraints and the costs and benefits to Maine of an early
shutdown of Maine Yankee.
An assessment of this issue was submitted by these agencies to
Governor Joseph E. Brennan in May, 1986. Subsequent legal decisions, more
detailed studies of the Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union, and analyses of
Maine energy alternatives in conjunction with the review of the proposed Hydro
Quebec power purchase provide new insight into the implications of an early
shutdown of Maine Yankee.
This analysis reviews the findings of the 1986 report, updates the legal
issues posed by the referendum, and expands the analysis of economic effects.
In addition, it presents the results of examinations of the Chernobyl nuclear
accident and a review of the environmental issues surrounding energy
alternatives.

SUMMARY OF THE 1986 MAINE YANKEE REPORT
Maine Yankee Assessment: A Report to Governor Joseph E. Brennan.
1986 analyzed the legal, technical, and economic issues associated with a
forced early shutdown of Maine Yankee.

Legal Issues
The 1986 analysis, based on a legal opinion of the Attorney General,
found it unlikely thatthe State of Maine has the legal authority to force an early
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shutdown of Maine Yankee on the basis of safety considerations of nuclear
plant operations. Citing a 1983 Supreme Court decision that federal authority in
nuclear power overrides State concerns regarding health and safety, the 1986
report noted that State action would require Congressional repeal of the
preemptive features in federal nuclear-related statutes.
The report also found "no more than a tenuous legal connection"
between the presence of a nuclear power generating plant and the placement
of a high-level waste repository in Maine. It noted that an early shutdown of
Maine Yankee would still leave its existing wastes to be disposed of and would
have no significant impact on the nation's nuclear waste problem.
Costs and Benefits of a Mandatory Shutdown
The principle benefit of an early shutdown of Maine Yankee is the
elimination of the risk of a catastrophic accident. The report also noted the
benefit associated with the cessation of production in Maine of low-level nuclear
waste and spent fuel. The costs of an early shutdown-higher energy costs to
households and industry, potential compensation to out-of-state owners, and
the jobs lost at Maine Yankee-were estimated to fall between $500 million and
$6.8 billion with a consequent loss of between 1000 and 1800 jobs.

THE 1987 UPDATE
This analysis reviews many of the issues discussed in the 1986 report.
In addition, it benefits from events and research subsequent to the 1986
publication. Included among these are:
•

a number of judicial decisions, including the First Lutheran case
decided in June of this year regarding the "temporary taking" of
private property;

•

the proposed CMP power purchase from Hydro Quebec
submitted in March and its subsequent analysis by the State
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Planning Office, Office of Energy Resources, Public Advocate, and
Departments of Conservation and Environmental Protection 1;
•

proposals for domestic power production competitive with the
purchase of power from Hydro Quebec submitted in response to a
request for proposals issued by Central Maine Power; and

•

a summary of analyses of the April1986 accident at the Chernobyl
nuclear power station in the Soviet Union.

The legal issues presented here are discussed in somewhat more detail
than in the 1986 report. A more comprehensive analysis of the economic costs
and benefits of an early shutdown is provided including the potential impacts of
compensation costs, and a more detailed breakdown of the regional rate
impacts of an early shutdown. Finally, this report presents an assessment of the
implications

of past power facility accidents and the environmental
consequences of alternative energy sources.

1 Pre!imjnaey Report on the Effects of the Proposed Purchase of Power from Hydro Quebec,
State Planning Office, May. 1987.
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2.

LEGAL ISSUES*

Two principal legal questions are raised by the proposal to force an early
shutdown of Maine Yankee: what authority exists for Maine to order a nuclear
plant shutdown on health and safety grounds? If authority can be established,
what is the value of the Maine Yankee nuclear plant and how much must Maine
taxpayers compensate its owners as a result of a mandatory early shutdown?
Although these issues were examined in the 1986 Maine Yankee
shutdown assessment, they require reexamination in light of several recent
United States Supreme Court decisions pertaining to the issues of federal
preemption and just compensation.
FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF A STATE-MANDATED SHUTDOWN

The Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, provides
Congress with the power to preempt state law. When a state law or regulation
establishes requirements inconsistent with federal legislation, the federal courts
evaluate the necessity of preempting state law. There are a number of federal
statutes which may conflict with, or preempt, a state law prohibiting the
generation of nuclear waste. These include: the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982; and the Federal Power Act of 1936.
To date, no Maine court has reviewed the question of state authority to
regulate radioactive waste generation in the context of federal law. However,
courts in Maine have evaluated federal preemption of state laws in other
matters. For example, a Maine law mandating severance pay in plant closings
was recently upheld by both the Maine and United States Supreme Courts,
notwithstanding issues of federal preemption. In this case, the courts concluded
that the federal jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board did not

* This is derived from a legal analysis provided by the Public Advocate. See appendix.
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preempt the Maine law, given State interests in preventing economic
dislocation due to plant closings.2
In a number of federal and state courts elsewhere, however, this issue
has received close examination with the consistent result that state authority
has been found to have been preempted and, therefore unconstitutional under
the Supremacy Clause. (See especially U.S. v. The City of New York.3) Based
on these numerous precedents which set forth under two distinct theories of
federal preemption, enactment of the 1987 Maine Yankee referendum is
unlikely to survive legal challenges in federal court.4
With particular reference to the issue of nuclear waste raised by the
referendum, the Atomic Energy Act preempts state regulation of nuclear power
safety and radiation hazards.
This was upheld in a 1983 Supreme Court
decision from California, Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy
Resources Commission .s In that case, the Court held that:
"State safety regulation is not preempted only when it conflicts with
federal law. Rather the Federal government has occupied the entire
field of nuclear safety concerns... "6 (Italics added)
A state law closing a nuclear plant due to waste disposal and safety concerns
would undoubtedly be found unconstitutional, barring Congressional
amendment of the Atomic Energy Act.

2 Pirector of Bureau of Labor Standards y. Fort Halifax Packing Co .. 510A2 1054 (ME 1986), cert.
den., _US_1987. See however, Baysjde Enterprises Inc. v. Maine Agricultural Bargaining
.6.Q.ard 513 A2 1355 (ME 1986) where Maine law was preempted by the federal Agricultural Fair
Practices Act.

3 643 FS 604 (SDNY,1978).

4 The theories can be summaried as follows: the Atomic Energy Act preempts state regulation of
nuclear power safety and radiation hazards; the Federal Power Act preempts state regulation over
wholesale sales of electricity in interstate commerce.
5 461

us 190 (1983).

sop. Cit, pages 212-213.
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JUST COMPENSATION
Both the Maine and United States Constitutions provide assurance that
private property may not be taken for a public purpose without payment of "just
compensation". These Constitutional guarantees, and the state and federal
court cases interpreting them, hinge on three successive issues:
When does the State have power to take private property?
If such power is lawfully used, does the State owe compensation?
By what measure of value must compensation be awarded?
Each of these questions presents different issues for consideration in the·
context of a forced shutdown of the Maine Yankee power plant.

State Power to Take Private Property
A state typically exercises its power to take private property by means of
its powers of eminent domain. The use of this extraordinary power has
prompted numerous courts to warn of the care necessary in evaluating whether
compensation is owed from such a taking.
There is considerable Maine and U.S. Supreme Court precedent for the
proposition that, when the state properly exercises its police powers to protect
the public health and safety the complete elimination of a non-conforming
business does not create a compensable loss under the Fifth Amendment or the
Maine Constitution.
While there must be a public use to justify a state taking, the U.S.
Supreme Court has stated that it is proper to defer to the Legislature (or in the
case of the 1987 Referendum to the voters) in determining whether the public
use is a reasonable one. Under current Fifth Amendment standards, it appears
that as long as the public use merely represents a "conceivable public
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purpose", a state will satisfy the threshold public purpose requirement.
appears likely that the 1987 Referendum would pass this threshold test.

It

Compensation Due Only When a Taking Has Occurred
Just compensation is owed only in circumstances where the courts find
that a constitutional taking has occurred. No taking occurs or is compensation
owed unless the state interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations to
a major and unsupportable degree. Recent Maine Law Court decisions go
further: just compensation may be due only in cases where the market value of
the condemned property has been reduced to zero. Due to the fact that the
affected property retained possible rental income potential or could be sold, the
Law Court concluded that no taking had occurred in a recent case:
It is clear from the preponderance of the believable evidence that
beneficial and valuable uses of their property remain available to the
Halls despite the denial of a building permit by the B.E.P. Accordingly,
we hold that there has been no taking of the Hall property in violation
of article 1, section 21 of the Maine Constitution. Hall v. Board of
Environmental Protection. A2 (1987), slip. op. at 5, 7/14/87.
It is by no means certain that either a federal court or the Maine Law Court
would construe the U.S. Constitution requirements on this basis in the case of a
state-mandated closure of Maine Yankee.?
In general, when property is rendered "substantially useless" due to state
action, a compensable taking has occurred.8 The question of whether the
forced closure of Maine Yankee constitutes a compensable taking will hinge on
interpretations of fact: will the Maine Yankee owners retain significant

?such an analysis would presumably consider whether the Wiscasset site could continue to
provide value for its owners by generating electricity by non-nuclear means or whether the costs
of such a conversion is prohibitive.
8Sjbley y. lnhabHants of the Town of Wells, 462 A 29, 31 (Me 1983); LURC v. White, 521 A 710
(Me 1987).
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beneficial uses of their property after closure, will the public utility status of the
owners insure mitigation of any loss, or will the value of the property realistically
be reduced to zero-?
principles of fairness:

In addition, the court will be guided by fundamental

"The purpose of forbidding uncompensated takings of private property for
public use is "to bar government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole." Penn Central at 1027 citing Armstrong v. US 364, US
40, 49 (1960).

Measure of Value For a Compensable Taking
The remaining questions concern the proper measurement of the Maine
Yankee owners' loss should compensation be due. The courts have
consistently ruled that compensation, when justified, should be based on the
"fair market value" of the asset. In this case, three measures of such value could
be applied. In descending monetary value, these three are: the costs of
constructing a "substitute facility" elsewhere; the economic value of the power
produced at the Maine Yankee plant; or the net book value of the power plant,
as recorded for ratemaking by the Public Utilities Commission and by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Replacing Maine Yankee with a substitute facility could cost between $35 billion, based on completion of recent nuclear power plants of Maine
Yankee's size or greater. While Maine Yankee's owners are obligated under
state utility laws to provide electricity to the public, they are not specifically
required to generate that electricity at a nuclear facility. Consequently, it would
appear that the "substitute facilities" standard would not be required in the case
of compensation due Maine Yankee's owners.
Since large nuclear power plants are rarely bought and sold, the value of
Maine Yankee on an open market will be exceedingly difficult to establish using
a comparable sales standard. Rather, the value of power generated at Maine
Yankee during the remaining years of its NRC license will probably be used as
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a reasonable approximation of fair market value. The cost of replacement power
was selected in the 1986 State Planning Office study as the most objective
standard for measuring any compensation owed to Maine Yankee's owners.
The third measure of fair market value is the net book value of the facility.
There is a question, however, of whether Maine Yankee's value can properly be
measured by the net book value of the facility as recorded in regulatory
accounting practice.

This question ultimately can only be determined by a

court, and is subject to substantial conflicting claims. On the one hand, the
courts have repeatedly discounted claims of loss for future profits as not
compensable under the Fifth Amendment.9

Hence, the Maine Yankee owners'

claim for compensation on a future return on the net book value of their asset
($209,339,893 as of June 30, 1987, including recent construction work ) is
subject to challenge. On the other hand, numerous courts have distinguished
as inconsistent the underlying purposes of ratemaking valuation of utility
property and of Fifth Amendment compensation.

Maine Yankee owners will

undoubtedly point to something in excess of net book value as the measure
regularly upheld in the case of public takings of private property.
Whichever of these three measure is ultimately determined by the courts
to apply, the actual impact of the 1987 Referendum will be borne by two
groups-Maine taxpayers and Maine electricity consumers, or ratepayers.
Maine taxpayers will bear the full cost of compensating out-of-state owners, the
effect of which will constitute a transfer from Maine's General Fund to the rest of
New England equal to 50°/o of the fair market value of Maine Yankee. The
ratepayers, on the other hand, will have to bear the full cost of any and all power
necessary to replace the electricity generated by Maine Yankee for use within
Maine. This distinction is important because some taxpayers are not ratepayers
and some ratepayers are not taxpayers.1 o Thus, the consequences of a

9"The opportunity to use property for future profit is not such a fundamental attribute of
ownership [as to require compensation]" Seyen Island Land Co. v. Maine LURC, 450 A2 475,
note 10 (Me. 1982), quoting Andrus y. Allard, 444 US 51, 60 (1980).
10 There is a substantial number of taxpayers who are not ratepayers of CMP, BHE, or MPS.
These include all the customers of Maine's publicly-owned in five towns, four cooperatives, and
four islands.
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mandatory early shutdown will be different for individuals or businesses in
Maine depending on how the Legislature, the Public Utilities Commission, and
the courts treat the compensation payment. The overall impacts on the State,
however, will be similar and are discussed in Section 3.

LENGTH AND COSTS OF LITIGATION
The 1987 Referendum could well set in process a complex and timeconsuming series of court challenges to the new law. The fact that these
questions have not previously been litigated in the context of a forced nuclear
plant closure will only add to the time and expense of these challenges.
Because any final judicial decision upholding the 1987 Referendum could well
stimulate similar efforts in other states, it is likely that the legal resources
available to the Maine Yankee owners will be substantial.
Consequently, it is likely that the litigation triggered by enactment of the
Referendum will not be concluded until well into the next decade, and will be
quite costly. It is not clear whether the costs of this litigation are precluded from
recovery at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for wholesale
ratemaking purposes. It is likely that, in future proceedings before the Maine
Public Utilities Commission, the recovery of these litigation costs in the retail
rates would, itself, be litigated.
A more important issue is whether the State would owe compensation
from the date of the Referendum's enactment, or from the date that a court finally
rules that compensation is due. Hypothetically, this later date could be 1992, if
Maine Yankee is shut down during this litigation period. 11

Until recently, the

answer to this question was relatively simple: Maine Yankee's owners would
have to wait for compensation until the date of a final court determination and
then only after all proper procedures and remedies had been pursued. At that
point, compensation could well be prospective only, and not encompass any
claim of taking for the period covered by the appeal itself.
11 Maine Yankees owners could seek a temporary restraining order to prevent enforcement of the
Maine law closing the plant.
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However, this conclusion is now subject to considerable doubt. A 1987
United States Supreme Court decision has for the first time concluded that, if
Fifth Amendment concerns ultimately compel payment of just compensation,
compensation is also owed for any "temporary taking" which occurred while the
issue was before the courts. First· English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, _US_, slip. op. 6/9/87. In cases where a
condemnee has been denied all use of its property during the appeal period
prior to a successful appeal, failure to provide "payment of fair value for the use
of the property during this period of time would be a constitutionally insufficient
remedy."
Based o~ this recent decision, it appears probable that replacement
power costs, or some other measure of fair value, would be awarded Maine
Yankee's owners for the appeal period, if Maine Yankee does not operate
during the appeal period. However, unless a court ultimately upholds the
constitutionality of the Referendum in a final judgment, and finds that a
compensable taking has occurred, no compensation would be owed Maine
Yankee's owners.
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3.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

I

The electricity supplied. by Maine utilities is generated from various·
sources. Maine Yankee, with an aver~ge capacity of 8.40 MW, produces, on
average, about 4.8 b!l~~on kwh per year, provides about 27o/o of all electricity
sold by Maine utilities, and supplies 22o/o of all the electricity consumed in- .
.
Maine. An early shutdown of this facility will hecessi~ate replacing that portion
of Maine's electricity needs currently fulfilled
Maine Yankee.
~~:;;:;~~~
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Closing Maine Yankee in 1988, 20 years ahead, of its scheduled retirement, would affect the Maine economy in several ways. First, securing
replacement power, both in the short and long run, will increase ener-gy costs to
Maine consumers and businesses. Second, th~ cost of .any compensation due
the owners of Maine Yankee would be borne by Maine taxpayers, furtrer
reducing their income, and draining ca~ital from the State. Finally, the Town of
Wi~ca~set _and surrounding communities would ~xperi,ence the loss of a major
employer and property taxpayer.
.

'

I

'

Some of these adverse effects will be offset by the economic
consequences· of creating replacement power capacity and energy_ in Maine.
The shift to additional domestic energy pro~uction, for example, will create job
opportunities and tax revenues as a result of building, operating, and fueling
new power facilities. Er'!lployment \will also be created in the design, sale,
installation, and per~?lPS production, of energy-saving devices.

REPLACEMENT POWER ALTERNATIVES

Replacement of the power lost due to an early s~utdown of Maine
Yankee would likely come from a mix of sources. ·In the short-run, replacement
power would come from the same sources currently tapped w~en Maine ·
Yankee shuts down for maintenance. These may include underutilized oil-fired
plants in Maine, the least expensive available units in the New England Power
Pool, and special arrangements with New Brunswick. Conditions for securing
this short-term power are less onerous today ttlan they were three years ago,

,
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and are likely to be in the future, largeJy because of low pil prices and a
. \
.
'
Canadian ~ower surplus.

'

A shutdown decision today would have long-term implications~ Over the
n,ext twe_nty years, it wo4ld be necessary to develop new sources of electric
capacity to replace Maine· Yank~e. · Intensified conservation, domestically
generate9 biomass, more small hyqroelectric facilities, oil, natural gas, and
coal p·ower, and the inO(eased importat.ion of Canadian-produced power· make

,
I

'

up the rartge-of alternative power sources like!y to be tapped over this longterm.< At ~he same·.-tim.e, Maine's total. energy needs continue to grow and
electricity .rates increase. The. ne.ed to meet bqth the replacement power needs
from. an ea~ly shutdown of Maine Yankee, and increasing energy demand will
ma~e the proposed importation of Hydro Quebec power by Central Maine
Power more co.mpelling.
.

(.

,

.

,

\«'

I

. I

....
Two recent devel-opments indicate a larger potential for available future
energy capacity than previously ~xpected. The recent Central Maine Power
proposal to purchase large blocks .of power from Hydro Quebec has enhanced
potential .Canadian import options. In addition, industrial firms and independent
power producers in Maine have proposed over 1400 MW of f}ew projects to
CMP at prices competitive with the Hydro Quebec proposal. Responses from a
similar request for proposals for conservation projects are under evaluation,
with further rounds of conservation bidding planned for 1988.

STATEWIDE ECONOMIC IMPACTS

Cost of Replacement Power
The uncert~inties of relative energy prices render precise rate impact
comparisons among replacement power alternatives impossible. Electricity
pricing is. very complex and depends on many highly variable and
unpredictable factors. Construction costs, long-term fuel prices, energy
technology, the success of cost-effective conservation projects, and the pricing
policies of the Public Utilities Cof'Tlmission all influence the price of new electric
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capacity.

As a result, it is impossible to predict accurately how the price of

power from a particular source will change over time.
Given the attention afforded the current Hydro Quebec proposal, and its
already appreciable influence on the potential price of new in-state power12 ,
this analysis assumes that new Hydro Quebec power will be included in the mix
of replacement power under the terms of the February 11, 1987 Letter of Intent.
This is not to pass judgment on the merits of this proposal. In fact, alternative
energy sources may be priced somewhat below or somewhat above the current
Hydro Quebec price.
To estimate replacement power costs, utility revenue requirements both
with and without Maine Yankee are projected for the next 30 years.

It is

assumed that in the case of a shutdown, the plant would be closed sometime in

1988.13 Meaningful analysis of replacement power costs requires further
assumptions r~garding future energy supply and demand conditions.

The

approach taken here has been to adopt typical current planning assumptions
for each of Maine's three largest utilities. Specifically:
•

power to replace Maine Yankee is assumed to come from a
combination of conventional sources, including renovation of
existing plant, expanded power purchased from domestic and
Canadian sources, and increased results from conservation and
load management programs;

•

fuel price escalation rates and capacity costs are the same as
those assumed by CMP in its recent analysis of the Hydro Quebec
purchase option;

12The recent agreement between CMP and Boise Cascade for the construction of a 75 MW
wood/coal fired cogeneration system in Rumford was priced at a discount below the Hydro
Quebec price, reported at 4o/o. In addition, industrial firms and independent power producers in
Maine had proposed over 1400 MW of projects to CMP at prices competitive with the Hydro
Quebec proposal.
·
13use of this date incorportates into the analysis at least a portion of the "temporary taking" costs
required by the recent First Lutheran decision, compared with use of a later date, such as 1992.
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•

while the aging of the nuclear plant at Wiscasset will likely reduce
its annual output as maintenance shutdowns become more
frequent, for simplicity it is assumed here that Maine Yankee
would continue to provide an average of about 840 MW annually
for the rest of its planned operating life. If so, 420 additional MW
would be needed to replace Maine Yankee power consumed in
Maine.

The results of this analysis are shown in Table 1. Replacing Maine
Yankee power could raise energy costs in Maine by $50 to $60 million per year
between 1989 and 1993, as indicated. This would rise to between $60 and
$100 million per year after 1993, due to the costs of developing new long-term
capacity. After 2008, the cost situation would reverse as a result of what are
called "end effects".

Table 1
REPLACEMENT POWER COSTS OF A MANDATORY SHUTDOWN
OF MAINE YANKEE
Replacement Power Cost
(Millions 1986$ )

TOTAL

1989-1992

229.6

167.3

41.3

21.0

1989-2008

1540.0

1123.0

248.0

168.0

1989-2015

984.0

732.0

150.0

102.0

1989-2008

984.0

719.0

160.0

105.0

1989-2015

779.0

573.0

125.0

80.0

(Present Value in 1989*)

* 4.3 % real discount rate

These end effects are the result of incurring the costs to replace Maine
Yankee earlier than would be the case if the plant ran through its license period.
Without a shutdown, Maine Yankee would have to be replaced in the year 2008
when its operating license expires. By replacing the facility earlier, these costs
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are accelerated in time. The result of these end effects would be to reduce
energy costs by $50 to $120 million per year between 2009 and 2015.
Assuming that consumer electricity purchases maintain proportions
roughly similar to 1986, these costs would be distributed between residential,
commercial, and industrial consumers as shown in Figure 1.14
Fi ure 1
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$120
$100
$80
MILLIONS
($86)
S6o

r-o$40
$20
$0
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008

These replacement power costs imply an overall increase in average
electric rates in Maine on the order of 5 to 10°/o between 1989 and 2008, with a
corresponding decrease for several years thereafter, as a result of the end
effects.

14 Based on proportion of sales revenue by customer class for CMP, Bangor Hydro Electric, and
Maine Public Service combined. These proportions are: residential--43°/o; commercial--27o/o: and
industrial--30%,. As noted earlier, Maine's utilities project increases in power costs over the next
five years for other reasons. It is not clear whether these increases will provoke major industrial
customers to reduce their purchases of electricity by generating power themselves. If such
reductions occur, the shutdown impact for residential customers will be significantly greater than
shown in Figure 1.

17
The actual rate effects of replacement power costs would vary around the
State, depending on local utility dependence on Maine Yankee. The greatest
rate impact would be felt in the Maine Public Service service area, primarily
Arrostook County, followed by the service areas of Bangor Hydro Electric, and
Central Maine Power. The impacts of these effects on Maine's regions are
discussed below, and illustrated in Figure 2, and Table 3.

Compensation to Out-of-State Owners
The legal issues surrounding compensation to out-of-state owners of
Maine Yankee are discussed in some detail in Section 1. As noted, the amount
of compensation owed to out-of-state owners will be determined only after what
is likely to be a p·rotracted legal debate. This analysis benefits by no more
precise indication of the amount of such compensation than did the 1986 report.
That analysis estimated compensation at between $120 million and $3.4 billion.
As discussed in the legal analysis, it does not appear that any compensation
due the owners could be less than the current net book value of the facility
which is $209,339,000; in the case of out-of-state owners, compensation would
be one-half the determined amount. For this analysis, we have used the cost of
replacement power measure to determine compensation. We have computed
this to be $984 million (see Table 3), or approximately $1 billion, for in-state
owners and oave used this figure for compensation to out-of-state owners as
we11.1s
As also noted in Section 1, it is likely that if Maine Yankee is closed
temporarily, prior to a successful appeal, the owners would be awarded
compensation for the period of this "temporary taking".

The amount of this

temporary compensation is not explicitly incorporated here (see footnote 12).
To illustrate the impact on the Maine economy of this $1 billion obligation
to out-of-state owners, we have used a compensation schedule which assumes
that this judgment is paid through a $1 billion bond issue over the balance of

15 This could be a conservative estimate since out-of-state owners are not likely to have access to
as inexpensive sources of power as biomass· and Hydro Quebec as do the in-state owners.
Without such access, the cost of replacement power will be as much as 20-30o/o higher.

,
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the license period of the plant (20 years). At an interest rate of 8%,,16 this would
require level payments of $101 ,852,000 each year from the General Fund.
Collection of this revenue is assumed to be achieved through an increase in
personal income taxes. The estimated impacts of these payments are
discussed below.

Income and Employment Impacts of a Mandated Shutdown
Higher electricity costs can affect jobs in two ways. For commercial and
industrial consumers, higher electricity costs can harm the competitive position
of Maine firms in comparison with other states or countries. With higher
production costs, these firms will be unable to capture larger, or maintain their
existing, shares of their markets, thereby forcing a reduction in employment.
This will be especially true for those firms which cannot produce their own
electricity.
For residential consumers, higher electricity prices reduce the amount of
disposable income available to support consumption.
This reduced
consumption, in turn, eliminates jobs throughout the economy but especially in
retail trade and other service sectors. Income lost to compensating out,.of-state
owners affects the economy in the same way. In addition, the drain of income
out of the State, as would occur in the case of compensation payments, reduces
the amount of capital available for investment in Maine businesses.
On the other side of the equation are the income and employment
additions associated with new domestic power production. While it is not at all
certain that Maine Yankee power would be replaced by power produced in the
State, Maine's nascent independent power industry has already seen
significant growth. The need for long-term power to replace Maine Yankee
could provide additional impetus for the development of this industry in Maine.

16 This is somewhat below the 30-Year Treasury Bill discount rate as an estimate of the cost of
capital to Maine for a 20-year bond issue. The actual rate could be lower since state debt could be
issued as tax exempt. Alternatively, such a large pubic issue could adversely affect Maine's
creditworthiness, forcing a higher interest rate.
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Cogeneration facilities at paper mills, along with free-standing wood-chip
and municipal waste generation plants have emerged as a major source of
electricity supply in Maine, rising from less than 1°/o of CMP's supply in 1975 to
approximately 15o/o today.

By 1990, these types of plants are expected to

provide 30°/o to 40°/o of CMP's supply.

It is anticipated that replacement power

needs from an early shutdown of Maine Yankee would result in the construction
of more cogeneration and independent power facilities in Maine.17
The income and employment impacts of higher energy prices and
compensation payments on the Maine economy were estimated using the
Maine Policy Analysis Model (MEPAM).

Those impacts resulting from

expanded domestic power production were drawn from the recent analysis of
the Hydro Quebec proposa1.1a

That analysis estimated the income and

employment impacts of 600 MW of domestic power capacity. For this analysis,
we have scaled down those impacts to reflect the need for only 420 MW to
replace Maine Yankee, all of which was assur:ned to be produced within Maine.
The income and employment impacts are presented in Table 2.
Employment impacts are presented for two time-periods-1989 through 1992;
and from 1993 to 2008- and are expressed as the average per-year impact
over each period. Income impacts are presented over the full period 1989 to
2008 and expressed as a present value in 1986 dollars. The net impacts of a
mandatory shutdown, as presented here, are the sum of the effects of higher
electricity costs and the compensation due out-of-state owners plus the positive
impacts due to domestic production.
As shown in the table, a mandatory shutdown of Maine Yankee could
cost the citizens of Maine $1.38 billion over the twenty year period from 1989-2008. This figure represents the present value of the income impacts of the

17 Additional jobs would also be generated through energy conservation programs. We do not
have good data to estimate the potential of such job creation and thus have not included it in our
analysis.
18 Preliminary Report on the Effects of the Proposed Purchase of Power from Hydro Quebec,
State Planning Office, May 1987.
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replacement power costs, payments to out-of-state owners, and domestic power
production.

Table 2
SUMMARY OF STATEWIDE ECONOMIC IMPACTS
OF A 1988 RETIREMENT OF MAINE YANKEE
INCOME IMPACTS
1989-2008

(Present Value, 1986 $)
Replacement Power

-$496 Million

Compensation Payments

-$1 ,311 Million

Maine Yankee Facility
(Direct & Indirect)

-$146 Million

Domestic Production*
(Direct & Indirect)

$575 Million

Net lrrpact

-$1,378 Million

EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS
{Average Annual Job Loss/Gain)

1989-1992

1993-2008

-650

-930

Compensation Payments

-1500

-700

Maine Yankee Facility
(Direct & Indirect)

-1300

-1300

Domestic Production*
(Direct & Indirect)

700

1600

-3500

-1390

Replacement Power

Net lrrpact

* Assumes that all of the replacement power (420 MW) is generated by facilities within the State of
Maine. To the degree that this is not the case, e.g., Hydro Quebec supplies some of the
replacement power, these numbers should be reduced proportionately.

Interestingly, the employment consequences of a mandatory shutdown
are less severe than one might expect in light of the significant income impact.
The replacement of Maine Yankee with domestic generation is itself an
employment generator. This occurs primarily through construction of new
facilities in the early years, and in the later years through harvesting and
transporting biomass fuel and operating the new facilities. These new jobs
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offset some of the employment losses associated with the higher costs of
replacement power and compensation payments. However, it is important to
note that these gains result only if replacement power is provided by in-state
facilities.

REGIONAL IMPACTS
Regional economic impacts of an early shutdown of Maine Yankee
would vary across the State. The rate impact of more expensive replacement
power would vary by the level of dependence on Maine Yankee power and the
location of energy-intensive businesses. Rates in Aroostook County would be
most affected, because that region relies more heavily on Maine Yankee power
than the rest of the State (45°/o in Maine Public Service territory compared to
22°/o Statewide).
This heavier rate effect is of special significance to the
Aroostook County economy where food processing, and paper productionelectricity-intensive industries-play such a large role. Moreover, such a large
rate impact would represent a significant cost increase, beyond increase
projected to occur over the next twenty years, to all electricity consumers,
especially small businesses, and low-income individuals.
The rate impacts for each of Central Maine Power, Bangor Hydro Electric,
and Maine Public Service are illustrated in Figure 2, and shown in Table 3. The
figures in this graph are uneven because of the timing and type of new capacity
additions in each utility's hypothesized 30-year generation expansion plans. It
should be noted that the graph in Figure 2 exhibits changes in average rates
and ll.Q1 necessarily the retail rates established by the Public Utilities
Commission. As was noted, Maine Public Service, and hence Aroostock
County, is most vulnerable to the economic effects of a mandatory shutdown, as
increases in electricity will reach as high as 20o/o by 2006. In contrast, the larger
size and lower dependency on Maine Yankee of both BHE and CMP serve to
moderate the rate impacts of an early shutdown, keeping them within the 5 to
9o/o range.
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The Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company provides about 290 full-time
jobs. In addition, it is estimated that operation of the facility supports an
additional 1000-1500 jobs around the State, including those related to
maintenance during temporary shutdowns. Obviously, these jobs are
concentrated in and around Wiscasset. Thus, an early shutdown would have a
severe impact on the Town of Wiscasset and vicinity, reducing the Maine
Yankee workforce to a skeleton crew and drastically reducing its contribution to
the property tax base. It is important to note that these effects will occur in 2008
in any case. However, such a precipitous closing would prevent the area from
taking any meaningful mitigating actions.
The distribution of economic benefits of additional domestic power
production an early shutdown of Maine Yankee would also vary. Direct
economic impacts will depend on the location of new power production
facilities and on the location of fuel resources and available transmission lines.
It is reasonable to expect these plants to locate primarily in northern, western,
and eastern Maine~ as these regions contain the bulk of Maine's wood and peat
resources. Moreover, the majority of recent biomass power purchase
agreements and proposed biomass facilities are located in eastern, central, and
northern Maine.
Employment and income benefits of conservation projects are likely to be
distributed around the State, but concentrated in Southern Maine. The indirect
economic impacts of new domestic power production will also be more
dispersed around the State.

DECOMMISSIONING

COSTS

The 1986 Maine Yankee Shutdown Assessment estimated costs of
$200,000,000 (in 1986 dollars) for dismantling and full decommissioning of the
plant. Current industry estimates for decommissioning a plant such as Maine
Yankee would likely be in the range of $190,000,000 to $210,000,000. This cost
must be incurred at some time, regardless of the outcome of the referendum.
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Some uncertainties persist in the factors which comprise
decommissioning cost analyses, however.
The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has, yet to release its revised Decommissioning Criteria for
Nuclear Facilities, which were initially proposed in February, 1985. The State's
future situation with respect to the January 1, 1993 deadline of the Low Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act (when the State must assume direct responsibility
for all low-level waste in Maine) is uncertain. The future readiness of DOE to
accept high-level waste shipments in 1998 remains questionable. Finally,
Maine law, 35-A M.R.S.A. Subsection 4356 (6), provides that "assurance is
needed that funds will be available for the cost of decommissioning which
would occur if a nuclear power plant is prematurely closed," and 35-A M. R.S.A.
Subsection 4356 (3) provides that if the Decommissioning Trust Fund is
insufficient to decommission the plant, the licensee would be responsible for the
deficiency. If the Company were unable to provide the full amount, the statute
provides that owners would be jointly and severally responsible for the
balance19.

19 A number of resource documents, representing a wide range of Maine Y~nkee
decommissioning topics, has been compiled and is available at the Public Utilities Commission
Information Resource Center.
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4.

HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

The principle benefit of an early shutdown of Maine Yankee is the
elimination of the risk of a catastrophic operations accident at that facility·. The
April, 1986 accident at the Soviet Union's Chernobyl-4 nuclear power station
has heightened public concerns regarding the safety of nuclear power in
general. A secondary benefit is the cessation of the production of low-level
nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel the Wiscasset facility.
Closing Maine Yankee eliminates the threats associated with an
operating nuclear plant. Those associated with decommissioning and waste
disposal remain, however. Moreover, sources of replacement power will,
themselves, have significant environmental and health impacts.

OPERATIONAL SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES*
Throughout their life, American nuclear reactors release very small
amounts of radioactivity which cause few adverse health impacts. The
.operating history of nuclear plants in the United States to date indicates to many
that the risk of a serious nuclear accident is extremely small.
. If a catastrophic accident were to occur, however, it would have lasting
impacts on public health and safety, the environment and the economy. The
most severe nuclear accident reported to date was the April, 1986 accident at
the Chernobyl-4 nuclear power station in the Soviet Ukraine. That accident
released over 100 million curies of radiation into the environment, resulted in
the deaths of 33 workers and firemen, and may be a principal cause of many
future radiation-related deaths. The Chernobyl accident required an evacuation
of the population within 18 miles of the plant and over 50 miles downwind,
dislocating 135,000 people. Soviet reports indicate that the area around
Chernobyl will be uninhabitable for 4 years. The long-term effects of this

* For more detail regarding safety aspects of nuclear plant operation, see appendix.
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radioactive contamination on the people, food chain, environment, and
economy of the Chernobyl area or the Soviet Ukraine are still under
examination and beyond the scope of current measurement.

Aspects of the Chernobyl Accident
In the past year, exhaustive studies of the April, 1986, accident at the
Soviet Union's Chernobyl-4 nuclear power station have been conducted. The
international scientific community continues its efforts to identify lessons from
that accident for improving nuclear plant safety. Conclusions which have been
drawn are similar, but recommendations based on those conclusions vary
widely.
As the Soviet report, prepared for the International Atomic Energy
Agency, stated:
"The accident at Chernobyl was the result of coincidences of
several events of low probability."20
Most published assessments concur with that statement, and go on to
attribute specific causes of the accident primarily to the design of the Soviet
reactor and to operator and procedural error.

System Design

The accident at Chernobyl-4 involved a Soviet-designed high-power,
graphite-moderated boiling-water-cooled reactor, identified as the RBMK-1 000
system. According to a compendium of U.S. assessments, this uniquely Soviet
design evolved from early demonstration and plutonium production reactors.
General characteristics of the RBMK and its predecessors include the use of
graphite as a neutron moderator arid light water as the coolant. Pressure tubes,
20 "The Accident at the Chernobyl' AES and its Consequences", U.S.S.R. State Committee for
the Utilization of Atomic Energy. August. 1986.
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contained in vertical channels in the graphite, either contain low-enriched
uranium oxide fuel or are used as locations for control rods and instrumentation.
The use of boiling water as a coolant in a pressure-tube, graphite-moderated
reactor distinguishes the RBMK design from any other reactor design.

Operator and Procedural Error
Chronologies of the Chernobyl-4 acci·dent reveal a number of operator
and procedural errors that contributed to the accident, which occurred during
the performance of a turbine generator test. The test procedures had not been
adequately reviewed for safety. Management control of the performance of the
test was not maintained, the test procedure was not followed, safety systems
were bypassed, and control rods were operated incorrectly. Operators lost
control of the reactor during the performance of the test.
Information available indicates that Chernobyl Unit 4 was one of the best
of the 14 operating RBMK- 1000 units. The training and experience of the
operating crew may have focused mainly on steady-state operation since the
reactor operated continually as a base-loaded unit with on-line refueling.
Evidently, there was very little, if any, training conducted on a plant simulator.
Only one simulator at another site has been mentioned as possibly serving the
training needs of operators of all 14 RBMK units.
The U.S. review concluded that the previous excellent performance
created an attitude in plant personnel that close adherence to procedures was
unnecessary; in effect, the previous trouble-free operation led to a dominating
overconfidence.
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An Industry View
The Atomic Industrial Forum, which refers to itself as "the association of
the nuclear industry," stated in an annual overview of the state of that industry:21
Chernobyl was the ultimate civilian nuclear disaster:

It

resulted in total destruction of a power reactor, widespread
distribution of radioactive materials over a broad area of the globe,
prompt fatalities, and the possibility of future health effects. The
accident raised questions in the minds of public officials, and
triggered a review of emergency procedures as well as a new look
at some U.S. containment systems. In many countries, including the
United States, Chernobyl was cited by some as a reason to close or
delay startup of nuclear power plants.
AIF concluded, however, that "both the design characteristics of the
Chernobyl-type reactor and the procedures followed by its operators combined ·
to create a situation that would not be duplicated anywhere else in the world."
The AIF statement continued by quoting the Association's President, Carl
Walske:
"Chernobyl enters the history books as the accident that proved the basic
correctness of nuclear power design and operating decisions made in
the West more than two decades ago. The major lessons of Chernobyl
are to be learned by the Soviets."

Implications of the Chernobyl Accident
Conclusions drawn about causes of the accident at Chernobyl-4 in April,
1986, point to system design inadequacies, management breakdown, operator
errors, procedural and training deficiencies, and equipment failures.
Compounding factors were inattentiveness, low levels of diligence, and
21 "The Nuclear Industry in 1986: A Year of Incongruities", Info News Release. Atomic Industrial
Forum, Inc., December 12, 1986.
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overconfidence by responsible personnel, who tended to trust previous
experience rather than carefully-developed procedure. Additionally, the
simultaneous occurrence of a number of these factors was unanticipated or
unforeseen in the development of planning scenarios on which Chernobyl-4
operations were based.
The conceptual problems stated above have some parallel outside the
Chernobyl-4 experience. For example, the following inadequacies were
identified in an Inspection and Enforcement investigation of the Three Mile
Island 2 accident of March, 1979:22
Perhaps the most disturbing result of the IE investigation is
confirmation of earlier conclusions that the Three Mile Island Unit 2
accident could have been prevented, in spite of the inadequacies
listed. The design of the plant, the equipment that was installed, the
various accident and transient analyses, and the emergency
procedures were adequate to have prevent~d the serious
consequences of the accident, if they had been permitted to function
or be carried out as planned ... The results of the investigation make
it difficult to fault only the actions of the operating staff. There is
considerable evidence of a "mind set," not only by TMI operators but
by operators at other plants as well, that overfilling the reactor
coolant system (making the system solid) was to be avoided at
almost any cost. Undue attention by the TMI operators to avoiding a
solid system led them to ignore other procedural instruction and
indications that the core was not being properly cooled. Without this
"mind set" they might well have acted to preclude or better mitigate
the accident.
The accidents at Chernobyl-4 and Three Mile Island 2 cannot be
dismissed as totally unrelated. Clearly evident in reports of both of these
incidents is the recurrence of the same generic operations failures,

22 Investigation into the March 29, 1979, Three Mile Island Accident by Office of Inspection and
Enforcement", Investigative Report No. 50-320/79-10, NUREG-0600, U.S. NRC, August. 1979.
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accompanied by recommendations and cautions that these failures be
addressed in future operations throughout the power industries.

Federal Preemption
One complication of the extension of experience, or "lessons learned", to
. improve safety or efficiency at nuclear power stations is federal preemption,
which in some critical areas removes state officials from direct jurisdiction over,
or perhaps even knowledge of, safety matters. A former Maine Chairman of the
Public Utiliites Commission, who was a member of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission during the Three Mile Island 2 incident, has described this
dilemma:23
"The consequences of the preemption of the states from nuclear
safety decision-making came home to roost in the aftermath of
Three Mile Island. ... At the point at which the federal regulators and
the utility were confounded by puzzling and dangerous events,
[Pennsylvania's] Governor Thornburgh was called upon to make the
first nuclear power plant safety decision ever entrusted to a state
official- whether or not to evacuate the surrounding population."
In this respect it may be noted that the Maine Legislature recently
enacted legislation creating a State program for the monitoring of safety at
Maine Yankee. P.L. 1987, c. 519 (AN ACT To Establish a State Nuclear Safety
Inspection and Monitoring Program for Commercial Nuclear Power Facilities in
the State).

23 Address by Peter A. Bradford, Chairman, Maine Public Utilities Commission, to the Nuclear
Plant Safety and Reliability Seminar, Valley Forge, PA. January 22, 1987.
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ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF CLOSING MAINE YANKEE

Decommissioning and Nuclear Waste Disposal
As noted in the 1986 report, final dismantling of Maine Yankee will
involve the handling of large amounts of radioactive waste. The NRC currently
recognizes three decommissioning methods - complete dismantling and
removal, in-place encapsulation ("entombment" and mothballing), or a
combination of these methods. Maine Yankee currently proposes to use the
complete dismantling and removal method. However, uncertainties persist as
to the future readiness of U.S. D.O. E. to accept high-level waste shipments, and
to Maine's future responsibility for low-level waste produced in the State.
As a result of these uncertainties, the timing of any Maine Yankee
decommissioning, which of necessity must await sites for low-level and highlevel waste, is difficult to project. Indeed, Maine Yankee may become an interim
high-level waste and spent fuel repository, as well as a low-level waste site, for
an indefinite period, depending on developments in these areas and the effect
of 35-A M.R.S.A. Subsection 4371 (discussed earlier). Although not a preferred
or even desirable method, long term on-site waste management has been
reviewed by Maine Yankee. If this occurs, it will happen irrespective of the
referendum's outcome, since Maine Yankee's high-level waste must be
disposed of.
Industry experience is rapidly evolving and is scheduled for review in an
International Decommissioning Symposium in October.
This session,
sponsored by DOE, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Nuclear
Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, is a follow-up to a DOE symposium in 1982.

Impacts of Replacement Power
Replacing power from Maine Yankee will also entail a range of
environmental and health impacts. Importation of Canadian power from Hydro
Quebec will require the construction of a large high-voltage transmission line
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from the Quebec border to CMP facilities in Maine. The construction of a
transmission line through western Maine presents several environmental issues
including soil erosion, impacts on fish and wildlife habitat, existing land uses,
recreation, water quality, and scenic quality.
In addition, operating alternating current (AC) lines have raised
questions about potential impacts on human health and welfare. Concerns
have been raised in other states about the health risks of extremely low
frequency (ELF) fields associated with AC power lines. To date, analyses on
this health effect are inconclusive.24
Constructing and operating several small power plants and hydro
facilities will have significant environmental consequences, as well. Among
these are the impacts of transmission line siting, air emissions, biomass
harvesting, disposal of ash, and damming of rivers.
Biomass fired power plants consume large quantities of biomass and
process water, and generate ash and various air pollutants. Resource
consumption, ash generation, and air emissions will vary with the size of the
plant and the particular fuel mix burned. The use of significant amounts of coal
or oil would require environmental controls to reduce the sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxide emissions to allowable levels. However, substitution of biomass
for oil may reduce some of the emissions, as is the case with the BoiseCascade cogeneration facility in Rumford.
These impacts and other plant construction, operation, and siting
considerations raise numerous environmental issues. Of special note is the fact
that coal and municipal waste ash, unlike wood and peat, contain heavy metals,
which may reduce available disposal options.
The total wood biomass harvest needed to fuel these plants is
approximately 4 million tons per year. This will come from a combination of
sawmill residues, the limbs and tops of trees cut for pulp or sawlogs, and whole
24 For more details, see Preliminary Report on the Effects of the Proposed Purchase of Power
from Hydro Quebec. Maine State Planning Office. May, 1987.
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trees cut exclusively for fuel (these trees are usually cut in the same area as
trees for sawlogs and pulp in order to minimize yarding and transportation
costs}. These amounts would be in addition to any currently-contracted biomass
or cogeneration facilities. Best estimates are that this additional demand would
approximately double existing whole-tree harvest activities.
Current and planned demand for wood from Maine's forests is still being
examined by the Department of Conservation and others. Until these studies
are complete, it is impossible to be certain what the impacts of additional whole
tree harvesting will be. However, it is possible that the additional demand from
these biomass plants could cause demand to exceed growth, and, absent any
efforts to increase the yield of our forests, could result in depletion of the
resource over a long period of time. It is more likely, however, that increased
demand would stimulate efforts at increasing supply.
Whole tree harvesting is thought by some to have potentially harmful
effects on the surrounding ecosystem. Of major concern is the potential for
depletion of nutrients from the forest soil due to the removal of large quantities
of biomass that would otherwise naturally decompose and restore nutrients to
the soil. There is also concern that there would be adverse impacts from
improper harvesting practices on wildlife population and habitat (especially
from clearcut operations} damage to trees left on the site, or damage to the site
itself. However, many forestry experts believe that these adverse impacts can
be mitigated. What will be more difficult to mitigate will be the creation of access
roads and other lumbering infrastructure which will result from a doubling of
present harvest levels.
Peat use as a biomass fuel raises unique environmental concerns.
Unlike wood, peat is a non-renewable resource. Efforts are now underway to
inventory the many peat bogs in Maine to determine those that contain unique
natural occurrences which may require special protection. Maine's first peatfired power plant is currently under construction in Washington County. This 24
MW facility will burn up to 164,000 tons of peat per year. Wood chips will be
used to supplement the peat fuel. A closed loop cooling water system which
extracts water from the peat itself will minimize water supply needs. Exhaust
heat from the boilers and steam turbines will be used to dry the peat during
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processing and storage. Up to 5,000 tons of peat ash will be generated on an
annual basis.
Hydropower projects use the potential energy of falling water as an
indigenous and renewable source of electric power generation. Generally
speaking, hydropower projects do not discharge "pollutants" to the air, land, or
water. However, hydro projects can significantly affect various public resources,
and numerous environmental issues related to the construction, operation, and
siting of these facilities are raised and addressed in the permitting process.
It is not clear how viable new hydropower is in Maine.
Surveys of
existing and potential hydroelectric sites indicates that significant hydro
potential exists.
However, recent responses to CMP requests for power
purchase proposals, however, included only 1 MW of hydroelectric power. This
would seem to indicate that new hydro in Maine is simply not competitive with
fossil fuel alternatives, and certainly not with Hydro Quebec.
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5.

CONCLUSIONS

Comparing the risk and consequences of a catastophic nuclear accident
against the economics of increased energy costs presents a formidable
challenge. A 1982 report conducted for the Nuclear Referendum Committee
stated:
"On the one side of the debate ... are those who emphasize risks and
uncertainties of continued nuclear operation. But it is difficult to
persuasively quantify the probabilities and the human and economic
impacts of catastrophic events ... nuclear risks versus nuclear
substitution economics-cannot at this time be recast into a common
measure and compared with one another in a noncontroversial social
cost/benefit assessment. .. ln defining positions on the plant shutdown
issue, quantitative analysis will continue to be supplemented by
subjective perceptions and nomative judgments ... "25
Quantifying the economic costs and benefits of an early shutdown, as
provided in Section 3, is an effort to put this complex issue into perspective. The
actual costs of replacing Maine Yankee could vary considerably from the figures
provided here. Of particular importance to the costs of replacing Maine Yankee
are 1) the price of replacement power, which, over the short term, will vary
directly with the price of oil and, which, over the long term, may or may not be
priced competitively with the Hydro Quebec proposal, 2) the actual cost of
operating Maine Yankee over the next 20 years, and in particular its power
output, as the plant ages, and 3) the basis upon which the owners of the facility
will be compensated, if compensation is required.
Whatever the actual costs of replacing Maine Yankee power, certain
things are clear. First, replacing Maine Yankee with other sources of generation
will come at a high cost to Maine ratepayers. Instead of being used to displace
expensive and unstable oil-fired generation, these sources will replace less

25 "The Impacts of Early Retirement of Nuclear Power Plants: The Case of Maine Yankee",
Raskin, P.O.; Rosen, A.A.; Energy Systems Research Group. August, 1982. p.2.
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expensive nuclear power, and, at least in the short term, increase the State's
vulnerability to the vagaries of international petroleum markets.
Second, the outcome of the referendum will have no impact on the
selection of Maine as a high-level nuclear waste site. As noted in the 1986
!

report to Governor Joseph Brennan, there is a tenuous connection, if any,
between the production of nuclear waste at Maine Yankee and Maine's
selection by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) as a potential high-level
waste site.

Further, Congressional approval of a Senate measure limiting the

number of high-level nuclear waste sites to one, would remove the threat that
Maine will become a high-level waste site. This bill would not eliminate the
issue of nuclear waste disposal, only the threat that Maine will be selected by
DOE.
Third, the outcome of the referendum will not change Maine's
responsibility for low-level nuclear waste. Under the Low Level Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1980, as amended, all states must take responsibility for the
disposal of low-level nuclear waste generated in the state by 1993.

In 1987,

through the work of the Maine Advisory Commission on Radioactive Waste, the
Maine Low-Level Radioactive Waste Authority was established to meet our
federal requirements.

The Commission and the new authority are seeking

arrangements for out-of-state waste disposal. If it is unable to make suitable
arrangements, the Authority must develop an in-state low-level nuclear waste
facility. Building any such facility in Maine is expected to cost up to $10 million.
Funds to pjan and build a disposal facility are to be raised through an
assessment against Maine Yankee between 1988 and 1992. While the cost of
out-of-state disposal is unknown at this writing, it is expected to be less than the
costs of an in-state facility.
According to a survey conducted by the Department of Environmental
Protection, Maine Yankee produces the bulk of the low-level nuclear waste
shipped from Maine.

Currently, many smaller generators of low-level waste in

Maine store it on site until it has decayed to less dangerous levels.

While an

early shutdown of Maine Yankee will greatly reduce the amount of such waste
generated in Maine, it is not clear how this would affect Maine's waste disposal
needs in the late 1990s and beyond.

This question is muddied by further
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uncertainties, e.g., whether Maine can find an adequate out-of-state disposal
option, how smaller waste generators dispose of future waste, and whether
waste generated by Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is to be a State or federal
responsibility.
The numerous issues surrounding nuclear safety, and Maine's long term
energy needs are as complex as they are compelling. Whatever its outcome,
the 1987 referendum will touch the lives of every Maine citizen. It is crucial that
a decision so critical to our future be based upon as clear an understanding of
its consequences as possible, tempered by an appreciation for the great gaps
in our knowledge and predictive powers.
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Memorandum from Stephen G. Ward, Public Advocate, to the Maine
Yankee Study Group Providing the Maine Yankee Legal Analysis

Stephen G. Ward
Public Advocate

John R. McKernan, Jr.
Governor

Executive Department
PUBLIC ADVOCATE
Telephone (207) 289-2445

TO:

Maine Yankee

St~

Group

FROM:

Stephen G. Ward, Public Advocate

DATE:

September 17, 1987

RE:

Maine Yankee Legal Analysis

I am providing the legal analysis for the 1987 Study, with
minor changes to the August 15 draft based on comments received from
interested parties.

A.

Introduction

Unlike prior referenda in Maine seeking the shutdown of Maine
Yankee, the current proposal does not narrowly address the question
of economic and safety consequences from continued plant operation;
it also targets the risk of nuclear waste generation and the
associated problems of disposal of high-level radioactive waste.
Although in each case, current and prior referenda proposals have
incorporated economic arguments for a Maine Yankee shutdown, the
1987 referendum for the first time will broaden the scope of the
debate to include high-level waste disposal, as well as the danger
of operator error or plant malfunctions.

In co~junction with DOE's review of in-state sites for a highlevel waste repository, these additional health and safety issues in

State House Station 112, Augusta, Maine 04333 - Offices Located on 5th Floor, State Office Building

the 1987 referendum debate will inevitably draw attention to a
central legal question:

what authority exists under current federal

and state law for Maine to order a nuclear plant shutdown on grounds
including the public health and safety?

Although this issue was
1

examined in the Governor's 1986 Maine Yankee shutdown assessment,
it deserves reexamination in light of several recent United States
Supreme Court decisions pertaining to the issues of federal preemption and just compensation for a forced closure of Maine Yankee.

This section of this 1987 report will examine the central
question of state authority to compel a Maine Yankee shutdown and
then will turn to the subsidiary questions of fair compensation to
the plant's owners in the event that the state does possess such
authority.

B.

Preemption

In a government of laws, such as ours, the enactment of a state
law will be assessed in terms of its potential for conflict with
existing federal law, under established court precedents.

One of

the primary tests which a newly-enacted state law must pass is to
demonstrate that it does not violate any provision of the federal

1

The "Staff Papers and Correspondence" appendix to the
previous State Planning Office May, 1986 report includes an April
2, 1986 letter from the Attorney General's office which commented
that ''to the extent that state action is not motivated by safety
or technological considerations of a nuclear power pl~nt, it will
not be preempted by the Atomic Energy Act", concluding that the
U. S. Supreme Court's application of the preemption doctrine
"will occur on a case-by-case basis".
2

constitution.

The 1987 Maine Yankee referendum raises questions in

several areas regarding possible conflicts with the United States
2

constitution and in particular the Supremacy Clause,
3

clause,

the Commerce

4

and the Contract Clause.

In the latter case, parallel

questions may arise under related provisions of the Maine
Constitution.

When a state law or regulation introduces inconsistent
requirements in an area already subject to federal legislation, the
federal courts evaluate the necessity of preempting the state law
under the long-lived doctrine of federal preemption.

The United

5

States Supreme Court

recently provided a summary of this doctrine:

"The Supremacy Clause of Art. VI of the
Constitution provides Congress with the power to preempt state law.
Pre-emption occurs when Congress, in
enacting a federal statute, expresses a clear intent to
pre-empt state law, Jones~ Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519 (1977), when there is outright or actual conflict
between federal and state law, e.g., Free v. Bland, 369
U.S. 663 (1962), where compliance with bot~federal and
state law is in effect physically impossible, Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132
(1963), where there is implicit in federal law a
barrier to state regulation, Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Ince, 463 u.s. 85 (1983), where Congress has legislated
comprehensively, thus occupying an entire field of
2

Article IV:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be
the supreme law of the Land".
3

Article I, Section 8:
"The Congress shall have Power ... to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with Indian tribes".
4

Article I, Section 10:
"No State shall ... pass any ... law
impairing the obligation of contracts".
5

Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC,
slip. op. at 12, 5/27/86.
3

--us--

regulation and leaving no room for the States to
supplement federal law, Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 u.s. 218 (194~or-where the state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full objectives of Congress.
Hines~ Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
Pre-emption
may result not only from action taken by Congress
itself; a federal agency acting within the scope of its
congressionally delegated authority may preempt state
regulation. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v.
De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982); Capital Cities
Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 u.s. 691 (1984)."

In the context of the 1987 Maine Yankee referendum, there are a
number of federal statutes which may conflict with, and conceivably
preempt, a state law prohibiting the generation of high-level
6

nuclear waste.

These include: the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,

which conferred on the Atomic Energy Commission and, in 1974, its
successor the Nuclear Regulatory Commission responsibility for
licensing, monitoring and regulating "the construction or operation
of any production or utilization facility" involving radiation
7

hazards; the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982

which confers on the

Department of Energy responsibility for locating, constructing and
operating radioactive waste disposal facilities; and the Federal
8

Power Act

which assigns to the Federal Energy Regulatory

6

42 USC 2011-2282, as amended in 1959 at 42 USC 2021 and in
1974 by the Energy Reorganization Act at 42 USC 5801-5891.
7

42 USC 10101 et

~·

8

18 USC 824 et ~·
Insofar as the Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Company is subject to wholesale rate regulation by FERC in
Washington, the forced closure of the plant under state law would
presumably require FERC approval for an abandonment of service to
wholesale customers, 35 of which are located in states other than
Maine.
4

commission responsibility for regulating wholesale sales of
electricity in interstate commerce.

Courts both in Maine and elsewhere have evaluated federal
preemption issues in the context of newly-enacted state laws.

In

Maine for example, a recent severance pay law in the case of
manufacturing plant closings was recently upheld both by the Maine
and United States Supreme Courts, notwithstanding issues of federal
preemption.

In both cases, the courts concluded that the federal

jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board did not preempt
the Maine law, given state interests in preventing economic
9

dislocation due to plant closings.

No Maine court to date has

reviewed the question of state authority to regulate radioactive
waste generation in the context of the three federal laws referred
to earlier.

In a number of federal and state courts elsewhere, however,
this issue has received a close examination with the consistent
result that such state authority has been found preempted and
therefore unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.

9

Director of Bureau of Labor Standards v. Fort Halifax
Packing Co., 510 A.2d 1054 (Me 1986), cert. den., ___ us___ l987 but
see Bayside Enterprises Inc. ~ Maine Agricultural Bargaining
Board, 513 A.2d 1355 (Me 1986) where Maine law found preempted by
the federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act.

5

Specific cases considering the generation or disposal of nuclear
waste include:

A.

Atomic Energy Act of 1954

1.

Northern States Power Co. v. State of Minnesota,
447 F.2d 1143, 1154 (8th Cir., 1971):
"Accordingly,
for the reasons stated, we hold that the federal
government has exclusive authority under the
doctrine of preemption to regulate the
construction and operation of nuclear power
plants, which necessarily includes regulation of
the levels of radioactive effluents discharged
from the plant"
(Minnesota emissions regulation,
although more stringent than NRC regulation and
therefore permitting dual compliance with both
state and federal law, found preempted under the
Atomic Energy Act);

2.

Train ~ Colorado Public Interest Research Group
426 US 1, 15 (1975): Atomic Energy Commission
retains "full authority to regulate materials
covered by the [Atomic Energy Act], unaltered by
the exercise of regulatory authority under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act", citing
Northern States Power Co. v. State of Minnesota as
affirmed "summarily" by the u.s. Supreme Court at
405 us 1035 (1972);

3.

United States ~City of New York, 643 FS 604, 612
(SDNY, 1978): a city's attempt to prohibit
operation of a university research reactor for
safety reasons found preempted under 42 USC 2021
due to the NRC's "radiological regulation of the
operation of nuclear reactors";

4.

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Board
284 NE.2d 342 (Ill, 1972): Illinois statute
regulating levels of radioactive discharges found
preempted by the Atomic Energy Act in state
court;

6

B.

5.

New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
v. Jersey Central Power and Light Co., 351 A.2d 337
(NJ, 1976): New Jersey court finds state
regulation of power plant emissions preempted by
the Atomic Energy Act;

6.

People of the State of Illinois ~Kerr-McGee
Chemical corp. 677 F.2d.571, 581 (7th Cir. 1981):
"In line with the opinions in Northern States and
Pacific Legal Foundation, we hold that the Atomic
Energy Act has expressly and impliedly preempted
regulation by the states of the radiation hazards
associated with nuclear materials". 10

Federal Power Act of 1935

1.

Mississippi Industries ~ FERC, 802 F.2d 1525 (DC
Cir, 1987): a state challenge to FERC's
reallocation of nuclear power plant costs among
utilities in a holding company system is rejected
due to FERC jurisdiction over sales of wholesale
electricity in interstate commerce;

2.

State of Minnesota v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir,
1984): Minnesota PUC challenge to a holding
company cost sharing agreement is rejected due to
FERC jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act;

3.

Nantahala Power and Light~ Thornburg, ____ us___
1986, 74 PUR 2.d 464, 465 (1986):
"FERC's allocation
of entitlement power to Nantahala is therefore
reflected in Nantahala's filed [wholesale] rates.
[The North Carolina Utilities Commission]

10
Also see Brown~ Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 767 F.2d 134
(7th Cir, 1985) where state authority over the movement of
radioactive materials is found preempted under the Atomic Energy
Act; a similar conclusion is possible in the case of state
authority in the context of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.

7

cannot substitute its own conception of what
allocation of entitlement power would have been
memorialized in a fair Apportionment Agreement
simply because FERC did not approve the
Apportionment Agreement without qualification".

4.

Federal Power Commission v. Southern California
Edison Co., 376 US 205, 2lS-16 (1964):
" ... Congress meant to draw a bright line easily
ascertained, between state and federal
jurisdiction, making unnecessary such case-by-case
analysis. This was done in the [Federal] Power
Act by making the FPC's [now FERC] jurisdiction
plenary and extending it to all wholesale sales in
interstate commerce except those which Congress
has made explicitly subject to regulation by the
states".

Based on these numerous precedents under two distinct theories of
11
there exists considerable doubt as to whether
federal preemption,
enactment of the 1987 Maine Yankee referendum could survive legal
challenges in federal court.

For the 1987 referendum to survive such challenges, the State
of Maine will have to demonstrate that the forced closure of Maine
Yankee does not frustrate achievement of Congress' full purposes and
objectives in enacting the Federal Power Act, the Atomic Energy Act
12
.
or the Nuclear Waste Disposal Act.
Nor that Congress has

11
The theories can be stated:
the Atomic Energy Act at 42
USC 2018, 202l(c)(l) and 202l(K) preempts state regulation of
nuclear power safety and radiation hazards; the Federal Power Act
at Sections 205 and 206 preempts state regulation over wholesale
sales of electricity in interstate commerce.
12
See International Paper Co. v. Ouelette,
op. 1/21/87, 55 LW 4138, 414~(1987).
8

US

, slip.

has demonstrated a "clear and manifest purpose" to supercede state
13
regulation.
Finally, the State of Maine will have to demonstrate
the possibility that Maine Yankee simultaneously can comply both
with the newly-enacted state law and existing federal laws and
14
regulations.
A recent u.s. Supreme Court case provides precedent
for state regulation of nuclear power which is found not to be
preempted by federal law, and therefore deserves specific mention.

In Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources, 659 F.2d
903 (9th Cir, 1981) a Federal Court of Appeals 'found that a
California law imposing strict preconditions on the siting of new
nuclear power plants in that state does not violate the Supremacy
clause, on the grounds that "inherent in the state's regulatory
authority is the power to keep [new] nuclear plants from being
built" ... Id at 926.

This decision was upheld by the U.S. Supreme

Court in Pacific Gas and Electric Co.

~

State Energy Resources

Commission, 461 US 190 (1983) with that court noting at several
points that state authority over planning for new power plants and
over ratemaking was not at issue.

Id at 207, 209.

However, the

Supreme Court directly-and without dissenting opinions--addressed
the issue of state regulation of nuclear safety and hazardous waste
disposal:

13
See California Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Guerra,
us
, slip. op. 1/17/87, 55 LW 4077, 4082.
14-- - See Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. ~ Paul, 373
us 132 (1963).
9

At the outset, we emphasize that the [California]
statute does not seek to regulate the construction or
operation of a nuclear power plant. It would clearly be
impermissible for California to attempt to do so, for such
regulation, even if enacted out of non-safety concerns,
would nevertheless directly conflict with the NRC's
exclusive authority over plant construction and operation.
Respondents appear to concede as much. Respondents do
broadly argue, however, that although safety regulation of
nuclear plants by states is forbidden, a state may
completely prohibit new construction until its safety
concerns are satisfied by the Federal government. We reject
this line of reasoning.
State safety regulation is not
preempted only when it conflicts with federal law. Rather,
the Federal government has occupied the entire field of
nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly
ceded to the states ... A state moratorium on nuclear
construction grounded in safety concerns falls squarely
within the prohibited field. Moreover, a state judgment
that nuclear power is not safe enough to be further
developed would conflict directly with the countervailing
judgment of the NRC ... that nuclear construction may proceed
notwithstanding extant uncertainties as to waste disposal.
A state prohibition on nuclear construction for safety
reasons would also be in the teeth of the Atomic Energy
Act's objective to insure that nuclear technology be safe
enough for widespread development and use - and would be
preempted for that reason.
Id at 212-213. (emphasis
added)
There can be little question that a state law closing a nuclear
plant due to waste disposal and safety concerns would be found
unconstitutional based on the Pacific Gas and Electric analysis,
unless Congress itself amended the Atomic Energy Act to authorize
state safety regulation of nuclear power.

In the event that the

1987 Referendum were perceived, presented and defended as a
reasonable effort to regulate nuclear power plant operation for
reasons other than public health and safety, the outcome is less
clear.

It is, however, a fair statement that the weight of authority

supports the probable preemption of the 1987 Referendum under either
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or the Federal Power Act.

10

C.

Commerce Clause and Contract Clause Concerns

Federal constitutional prohibitions against interference with
interstate commerce or against state laws impairing existing
contracts pose a broad range of questions whose answers are not as
easily determined as is the case for federal preemption.

In the

case of unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce, the
Federal Power Act cases referred to above also comprise authority
for Commerce Clause violations.

In a 1970 decision, Pike

~

Bruce

Church, 397 US 137, 142 (1970), the U.S. Supreme Court enunciated a
balancing test for determining when state regulation of interstate
commerce exceeds the limits of the Commerce Clause:
"where the [state] statute regulates evenhandedly
to effectuate a legitimate local public interest
and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits ... And the
extent of the burden that will be tolerated will
of course depend on the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.

Given 50% ownership of Maine Yankee by out-of-state utilities, it
will be difficult to characterize the closure of the plant as having
only an "incidental" effect on interstate commerce.

However, enactment of the 1987 Referendum cannot be
characterized as an effort to secure for Maine citizens and
ratepayers an economic advantage at the sole expense of out-of-state

11

citizens or ratepayers; fully 50% of the costs of replacement power
plus 100% of any constitutionally required compensation to Maine
Yankee's owners will ultimately be borne by Maine citizens alone.
Hence, in this respect, the Referendum's enactment would not
interfere with interstate commerce to the extent of causing citizens
elsewhere to bear all costs, with consequent benefits to be received
15
solely by Maine citizens.

The question of excessive burdens on interstate commerce also
generates a related concern:

can the local interests of opposing the

siting in Maine of a nuclear waste facility or of halting the instate generation of nuclear waste be promoted by methods which have
a "lesser impact" on interstate commerce?
issues, and application of the Pike

~

Resolution of these

Bruce Church balancing test,

will necessarily await actual litigation in the event that the 1987
Maine Yankee referendum is enacted.

As with the analysis of Commerce Clause violations, the
constitutionality of a state law under the Contract Clauses of the
Maine or United States Constitutions requires demonstration of a
16
substantial public purpose.
As stated by the u.s. Supreme

15
See North Western Portland Cement v. Minnesota, 358 US
450, 457 (1959).
A court, of course, could determine that the
replacement power costs imposed on out-of-state ratepayers in and
of themselves impose an excessive burden on interstate commerce,
notwithstanding the significantly greater costs also imposed on
Maine ratepayers and taxpayers.
16
The Maine Constitution at Article I, Section 11 states:
"The Legislature shall pass no ... law impairing the obligation of
contracts".

12

Court in Energy Reserves Group, Inc.

~Kansas

Power and Light Co.,

459 US 400, 411-12 (1983), an unconstitutional impairment of
contract requires a showing first that impairment is substantial,
also that there is no "significant and legitimate" public purpose
and finally that the resulting adjustment of contract rights is
unreasonable.

Federal and State courts have found constitutionally

sufficient public purposes in state laws which:

1)

prohibited the sale of milk in plastic milk
containers, given state interests in
renewable sources and in energy conservation
Minnesota~ Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
us 456 (1981);

2)

required the local registration of securities
offerings --Hall~ Geiger-Jones Co., 242 US
539 (1917);

3)

regulated freighter emissions notwithstanding Coast
Guard licensing of ships -- Huron Portland
Cement Company~ Detroit, 362 US 440 (1960);

4)

established municipal woodyards for the
·distribution of firewood -- Laughlin v. City
of Portland, 90 A 318 (Me 1914).

The breadth of these examples of permissible public purposes under
the Commerce or Contract Clauses illustrates the difficulty of
predicting how the courts would evaluate the legitimacy of the
purposes underlying the 1987 Referendum.

As noted by the Maine Law

Court in a 1977 case, the "freedom to contract is necessarily
subject to reasonable police power measures intended to promote and
preserve the welfare of citizens".
13

National Hearing Aid Centers v.

Smith, 376 A.2d 456, 461 (Me 1977).

This is particularly true of

contracts among regulated utilities for the generation of electricity
where contract terms rountinely are conditioned on continued
17
regulatory approval and oversight.

The reasonableness of methods selected by the state for
implementing a legitimate public purpose is the remaining major
I'

'

component in the constitutional analysis required under the Pike v.
Bruce Church and Energy Reserves decisions for the Commerce Clause
and Contract Clauses, respectively.

The Maine Law Court that "the

methods adopted by the Legislature" need not "be the best or wisest
choice ... if the measure is reasonably appropriate to accomplish the
intended purpose".

National Hearing Aid Centers at 461.

However,

state action will be ruled overburdening unless the local interest
simply cannot be served by any less disruptive or burdensome
18
alternative.
Here again, the rationale for the 1987 Referendum is
crucial.

Given the inaction of Congress in resolving radioactive

waste siting controversies generated by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
of 1982, the courts will determine if less disruptive or burdensome
17
This point is further amplified in a December 4, 1984 Attorney
General letter opinion which examined the specific contract
provisions of the Seabrook Joint Ownership Agreement (JOA) and
found that a Maine Public Utilities Commission order requiring
Maine's Seabrook owners to disengage from that project would "not
violate the reasonable expectations of the parties to the JOA, and
would not be found to 'impair' the contract, in the constitutional
sense at all."
18
Edgar v. Mite Corporation, 457 US 624 (1982) where a
state law requiring tender offers anywhere in the country be
registered in Illinois was struck down notwithstanding its
protection of local investors from corporate take-over. Also see
Hunt ~ Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 432 US 333
(1977).
14

alternatives exist to the outright closing of Maine Yankee under
state law.

To the extent that the fundamental rationale of the 1987

Referendum is presented instead as a purely economic matter, focusing hypothetically on alleged losses on property values near the
Wiscasset reactor, a court will evaluate an entirely different set
of alternatives to plant closure - such as general fund compensation for affected property owners.

If the burden on interstate

commerce, or interference with the contract rights of Maine Yankee's
owners and customers, is found to be excessive, the 1987 Referendum
will be ruled unconstitutional on either or both of these grounds.

D.

Just Compensation under the Fifth Amendment

Both the Maine and United States Constitutions provide
assurance that private property may not be taken without a public
19
purpose and without payment of just compensation.
These
Constitutional guarantees, as well as the state and federal court
cases interpreting them, hinge on three successive issues:

when

does the State have power to take private property?

If such power

is lawfully used, does the State owe compensation?

By what measure

of value must compensation be awarded?

Each of these questions

presents different issues for consideration in the context of a
forced shut down of the Maine Yankee power plant.

19

Article I, Section 21 of the Maine Constitution provides:
"Private property shall not be taken for public uses without just
compensation; nor unless the public exigencies require it" The
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constituion reads in part:
" ... nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation".
15

1)

State Power To Take Control Use of Private

Prope~!Y,

A state typically exercises its power to control the use of
private property by regulating the use of the property.

Some

the control is achieved in a manner that constitutes a taking
private property.

f

the

A taking may also be accomplished overtly by

means of eminent domain authority.

The use of these extraordinary

powers has prompted numerous courts to caution that considerable
care is necessary to evaluate whether compensation is owed at al
For example, the Maine Law Court has stated in this context:
"Before legislation may be declared in violation of the
Constitution, that fact must be established to such a degree of
certainty as to leave no room for reasonable doubt' 1 ,.
Wat.~r

1975).

District Y.::_ Penobscot County Water CompanY., 348
Furthermore, there is considerable Maine and

Orono-Veazie

-~-.-~·-..-.o..,~,...-

A~

2d 24

u.s.

(Me

Supreme

Court precedent for the proposition that, when the state
exercises its police powers, the complete elimination of a nonconforming business may not create a compensable loss under the
20
Fifth Amendment or its state constitutional equivalent.
20

Hadacheck ~Los Angeles, 239 US 394 (1915), zoning
ordinance shuts down brickyard; Mugler ~ Kansas, 123 US 623
(1887), brewery closed by Prohibition Law; Reinman v. Little
Roc~; 237 us 171 (1913), livery stable closed as a nui.sance®.
Also see, Shapiro Brothers Shoe Co. ~ Lewiston-Auburn, 320 A.2d
247 (Me. 1974), severance pay required; State v. Lewis, 406 A.2d
886 (Me~ 1979), junkyard closed; State v. McKinnon,-r-33 A .. 2d 885
(Me 1955), game preserve created; Jones-v. Polland, 93 A.2d 41
(Me. 191.5), aff 'd 245 US 217 ( 1917), fuel yard created; WadJ7_eiSLh. v ~
Gilman, 12 Me. 403 (Me. 1835) wooden structures prohibited.
In
none of these cases did the Fifth Amendment or Maine constitution.
require the payment of compensation.

16

While there must be a public use to justify a state taking, the

u.s.

Supreme Court has stated that it is proper to defer to the

Legislature (or in the case of the 1978 Referendum to the voters) in
determining
Housing

whether the public use is a reasonable one.

Authority~

Midkiff 467 US 229, 244 (1984).

Hawaii

Under current

Fifth Amendment standards, it appears that as long as the public use
merely represents a "conceivable public purpose", a state will
satisfy the threshold public purpose requirement. Id. at 241.
Assuming the Referundum survives constitutional challenge under the
Supremacy, Commerce, and Contract Clauses, it appears likely that
the 1987 Referendum would pass this threshold test, i.e., that the
Referendum would be found to reflect a reasonable public purpose so
as to justify state control of the use of the propertya

The

question then becomes whether the exercise of the control
constitutes a taking or merely a reasonable regulation of use.

2)

Compensation Due only when a Taking has Occurred

Just compensation is owed only in circumstances where the
courts find that a constitutional taking has occurred.

The courts'

inquiry will necessarily be ad hoc and circumstantial and involves
no pat formula.

Connolly~

Ct. 1018, 1026 (1986).

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 106 S.

No taking occurs, or is compensation owed,

unless the state interferes with distinct investment-backed
expectations to a major and unsupportable degree.
Transportation

Corp.~

New York City, 98

s.

Recent Maine Law Court decisions go futher:

Penn Central

Ct. 2646, 2659 (1978).
just compensation may

be due only in cases where the market value of the condemned
17

property has been reduced to zero.

Due to the fact that the

affected property retained rental income potential or could be sold,
the Law Court concluded that no taking had occurred in a recent
case:

It is clear from the preponderance of the
believable evidence that beneficial and
valuable uses of their property remain
available to the Halls despite the denial of
a building permit by the B.E.P. Accordingly,
we hold that there has been no taking of the
Hall property in violation of article 1,
section 21 of the Maine Constitution. Hall
v. Board of Environmental Protection,
-- A.2d ___ (1987), slip. op. at 5, 7/14/87.

It is by no means certain that either a federal court or the Law
Court would construe the U.S. Constitution requirements on an
identical basis in the case of a state-mandated closure of Maine
21
Yankee.

The general rule has been that when property is rendered
"substantially useless" due to state action, a compensable taking
has occurred.

Sibley~

29, 31 (Me 1983); LURC

Inhabitants of the Town of Wells, 462 A.2d

~White,

521 A.2d 710 (Me 1987).

Examples of

compensable takings in U.S. Supreme Court precedent follow this
general rule, not requiring elimination of all property values in
the case of aircraft overflights, artillery shells over claimants'

21
Such an analysis would presumably consider whether the
Wiscasset site could continue to provide value for its owners by
generating electricity by non-nuclear means.

18

property, or repeated floodings caused by a water project.
Central at 2661.

See Penn

Based on these and other cases, it is clear that

the question of whether the forced closure of Maine Yankee
constitutes a compensable taking will hinge on interpretations of
fact:

will the Maine Yankee owners retain significant beneficial

uses of their property after closure, will the public utility status
of the owners ensure mitigation of any loss or will the value of the
property realistically be reduced to zero?

In determining how these

questions of fact are answered, the court will be guided by
22
It remains uncertain if
fundamental principles of fairness.
these principles compel payment to Maine Yankee's owners of any
compensation whatever, particularly given the public utility status
of the owners.

3)

Measure of Value for a Compensable Taking

In the event that some compensation will be due, on the basis
that a taking has occurred, the remaining questions concern the
proper measurement of the Maine Yankee owners' loss.

There are

three standards of value which could be applied if the courts find
that compensation is required.

In descending monetary value, these

three are:

(a) the costs of constructing a "substitute facility"

elsewhere,

(b) the fair market value of the nuclear power plant and

22
"The purpose of forbidding uncompensated takings of
private property for public use is "to bar government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole".
Penn Central at 1027 citing Armstrong v. US, 364 US 40, 49
(1960).
----
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(3) the book value of the power plant, less depreciation, as
recorded for ratemaking by the Public Utilities Commission and by·
the Federal Energy Regulatory Administration.

a)

Substitute Facility

The use of a "substitute facility" measurement of just
compensation can be expected to cost a total of $3-5 billion in
construction costs and interest expense, based on completion costs
for recent nuclear power plants of Maine Yankee's size or greater.
In a 1979 case, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
"substitute facilities" measure of compensation for condemned
property owned by a non-profit summer camp organization.
564.54 Acres of Land, 441 US 506 (US, 1979).

US v.

Noting that

"substitute facilities" compensation has been ordered primarily in
the case of public condemnees, such as roads or sewers taken by the
state for another purpose, the Court stated:

In condemnations of property owned by public
entities, lower courts have applied the
reasonable-necessity standard to determine if the
entity has an obligation to continue providing the
facilities taken ... If the condemnee has such a
duty to replace the property, these courts have
reasoned that only an award of the costs of
developing requisite substitute facilities will
compensate for the loss. US v. 564.54 Acres of
Land at 515.
------

In the case of Maine Yankee, its owners are obligated under
varying state utility laws to provide electricity to the public, but
are not specifically required to generate that electricity at a

20

nuclear facility.

Consequently, it would not appear that the

"substitute facilities" standard would be required in the case of
compensation due Maine Yankee's owners.

b)

Fair Market Value

While generally the courts have held that fair market value is
23
its use is not compelled
the normal basis for just compensation,
in cases which would result in "manifest injustice to owner or
24
public" or where fair market value is difficult to ascertain.
Because public utility facilities rarely trade hands, it certainly
is the case that the value of Maine Yankee as a capital asset sold
on an open market will be exceedingly difficult to establish.

The

value of capacity and energy generated at Maine Yankee during the
remaining years of its NRC license is more susceptible to fair
market value estimation within the existing NEPOOL market for power;
in fact, the cost of replacement power is selected in both 1986 and
1987 State Planning Office studies as the most objective standard
for measuring any compensation w:hich might be owed to Maine Yankee's
owners.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of making precise estimates

of the value of the facility itself, there can be little doubt that
the Maine Yankee owners will point to fair market value compensation

23
Olson v. US, 292 US 246, 255 (1934), Knox Lime Co. v.
Maine state Highway Commission, 230 A.2d 814 (Me 1967).
24
US v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 US 121, 123 (1950);
US v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 US 24, 30 (1984).
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as the measure which has been regularly upheld in the case of public
takings of private property.

c)

US v. 564.54 Acres of Land at 515.

Net Book Value

The remaining question then becomes:

can Maine Yankee's value

properly be measured by the net book value of the facility, after
adjustments for depreciation over 15 years, and as recorded in
regulatory accounting practice?

This question ultimately can only

be determined by a court and is subject to conflicting claims.

On

the one hand, the courts have repeatedly discounted claims of loss
.
25
for future profits as not compensable under the Fifth Amendment;
hence, the Maine Yankee owners' claim for compensation on a future
26
return on the net book value of their asset
is subject to
challenge.

On the other hand, numerous courts have distinguished as

inconsistent the underlying purposes of ratemaking valuation of
27
utility property and of Fifth Amendment compensation.

To the extent that any compensation paid to the owners will be
treated as a credit in setting retail rates for Maine Yankee's

25
"The opportunity to use property for future profit is not
such a fundamental attribute of ownership [as to require
compensation]" Seven Island Land Co. v. Maine LURC, 450
A.2d 475, note 10 (Me. 1982), quoting~ndrus v. Allard, 444 US
51, 60 (1980).
26
Maine Yankee's net book value as of June 30, 1987, including
recent construction work, was $209,339,893, plus nuclear fuel.
27

onondaga County Water Authority~ NY Water Service Corp.,
13 9 NY. 2d 7 55, 7 6 3 ( 19 55) .
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owners, it is probable that any taxpayer payment to Central Maine
Power, Maine Public Service and Bangor Hydro ultimately will be used
to reduce their respective costs of service to Maine ratepayers.

If

the Public Utilities Commission were to adopt this ratemaking
treatment, the actual impact of the 1987 Referendum on Maine
ratepayers would become the increased costs of replacement power
28

alone.

However, it is by no means as clear that utilities

commissions in the other New England states are authorized, or
compelled, to make the same offsetting adjustment in retail rates
for Maine Yankee's seven out-of-state owners.

Hence, Maine

taxpayers will necessarily have to bear the full requirement of
compensating these out-of-state owners.

In effect, this would

constitute a transfer payment from Maine's General Fund to the rest
of New England equal to 50% of the value of Maine Yankee.

4)

Length and Costs of Litigation

Based on the previous discussion of federal preemption,
Commerce Clause, Contract Clause and taking questions under the

28

Additionally, Maine taxpayers who are not ratepayers of
the Maine owners would bear the full cost of the increased tax
obligation, without any offsetting adjustment in retail rates.
This group would include all ratepayers of Maine's publicly owned
utilities, including the towns of Madison, Houlton, Kennebunk and
the Union River, Fox Island and Eastern Maine Electric
Cooperatives. The latter, serving 9000 customers in Penobscot,
Washington and Aroostook counties would additionally lose its
entitlement to a small amount of Maine Yankee capacity and would
consequently bear the costs of replacement power as well.

23

Fifth Amendment, it is evident that the enactment of the 1987
Referendum could well set in process a complex and time-consuming
series of court challenges to the new law.

The fact that these

questions have not previously been litigated in the context of a
forced nuclear plant closure will only add to the time and expense
of these challenges.

Insofar as any final judicial decision

upholding the 1987 Referendum could well stimulate similar efforts
in other states, it is likely that the legal resources available to
the Maine Yankee owners will be substantial.

Consequently, it is easy to predict that the litigation
triggered by enactment of the Referendum will not be concluded until
well into the next decade and tht it will be costly.

The

recoverability from ratepayers of costs of this litigation (at the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for wholesale ratemaking
purposes and at the Maine Public Utilities Commission for retail
making purposes) may itself be the subject of future litigation.

The more important issue is whether, assuming no pre-emption,
the state would owe compensation from the date of the Referendum's
enactment, as opposed to the date that a court finally rules that
compensation is due - hypothetically in 1992.
answer to this question was relatively simple:

Until recently, the
Maine Yankee's

owners would have to wait for compensation until the date of a final
court determination and only then after all proper procedures and
remedies had been pursued.

As of that eventual date, compensation

24

could well be prospective only and not encompass any claim of taking
29
for the period covered by the appeal itself.

A 1987 United States.Supreme Court decision has for the first
time concluded that, if Fifth Amendment concerns ultimately compel
payment of just compensation, compensation is also owed for the
"temporary taking" which occurred while the issue was before the
courts.

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale

county of Los Angeles, ___us___ , slip. £2· 6/9/87.

~

In cases where a

condemnee has been denied all use of its property during the appeal
period prior to a successful appeal, failure to provide "payment of
fair value for the use of the property during this period of time
would be a constitutionally insufficient remedy."
slip. 2£· at 16.

First Lutheran,

Based on this recent decision, it appears probable

that replacement power costs, or some other measure of fair value,
would be awarded Maine Yankee's owners for the appeal period, if
they eventually prevail in a claim for just compensation.

It should be noted, however, that given the likelihood of
federal preemption of the 1987 Referendum, Maine Yankee's owners
could well prevail in any request for a Temporary Restraining Order
permitting the continued operation of the power plant during the
period of litigation.

In such a case, compensation for a temporary

29
See MacDonald, Sommer and Frates v. Yolo ounty, 477
US===, slip. QE· (1986); Williamson-count¥ Regional Planning
Comm. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 US 172, n. 11 (1985); but see US v.
Sioux Nation of Indians, 100 S. Ct. 2716 (1980) where the Court
orders interest from 1877 as proper measure of retroactive
compensation.

25

taking need not be awarded since the power plant will not cease
operation as a result of state action.

If the owners simply comply

with state law and seek no injunction permitting the continued
operation of the plant, the First Lutheran decision arguably could
compel state payment for all costs during the appeal period.

Such a

decision by the owners, of course, would have major detrimental
effects on electric rates throughout New England.

Unless a court ultimately upholds the constitutionality of the
Referendum in a final judgment, and finds that a compensable taking
has occurred, no compensation would be owed Maine Yankee's owners.
Without specific findings that no Supremacy, Contract or Commerce
Clause violation has occurred, the 1987 Referendum will be overturned
and have no force and effect.

26

Appendix 2

Maine Public Utilities Commission Staff Estimates of Annual Costs
to Replace Maine Yankee Power, 1989-2008

Appendix 3

Memorandum from Joseph Sukaskas to Richard Parker, Maine
Public Utilities Commission Regarding Nuclear Safety and
Decommissioning Issues

STATE OF MAINE
lnter. .Departmental Memorandum
To

Richard Parker, Senior Utility Planner

From Joe Sukaskas, Technical Analyst
Subject_

Date_A_u_g_u_s_t_6_,_ 198 7

Dept. _____P_u_c__-_T_e_c_h_n_l_·c_.a_l__
A_n_a_l_y_s_i_s__
Dept.

PUC

- Technical Analysis

Maine yankee Shutdown

Your July 21 memo assigned me the responsibility to "review and update decommissioning cost estimates, and nuclear safety issues" for the Maine Yankee Shutdown
Assessment 1987 Update.
Attached are my draft comments and material compiled to address those issues.
My comments are in draft form, and will need to be integrated into an overall outline at a later date.
With respect to safety, comparisons have been made between Maine Yankee and
other plants, and a summary of the plant's last three years' safety reports is
included.
As spent nuclear fuel is a topic which is integral to both safety and also
other shutdown-related issues as well, an update is provided on both economic and
physical aspects of this topic.
A summary of potential Maine Yankee accident costs has been included, followed
by an update of the implications of Chernobyl. That section includes both technical
and systematic parallels, and touches briefly on complications of preemption.
Finally, an update of Maine Yankee decommissioning factors is presented, along
with a listing of decommissioning resources for further reference.
Some of the information enclosed can be directly inserted into the study report body, if found acceptable by the coordinating·staff. Parts of the attached
information may be more appropriate for inclusion in a technical appendix, however.
All referenced materials are available in the MPUC IRC.
Please advise what additional information you would like, or what restatement
or redrafting of these materials could be useful in completing the assessment report.
cc:

Richard Darling

MAINE YANKEE SHUTDOWN ASSESSMENT
JDS COMMENTS/MATERIAL

Generation Productivity
Unplanned Reactor Scrams
NRC Evaluations
Safety Reporting

Spent Nuclear Fuel
Spent Fuel Storage

Financial Consequences of a Catastrophic Accident
Chernobyl
System Design
Operator and Procedural Error
An Industry View
Implications of the Chernobyl Accident
Federal Preemption

Deconunissioning
MPUC Resources - Maine Yankee Decommissioning

NRC EVALUATIONS.
A measure of the compliance of nuclear generating stations with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) performance criteria is
the NRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program.
The SALP program is an integrated NRC staff effort to consolidate
available observations and data and to evaluate licensee performance based
on this information.
It assesses licensee performance in selected functional areas.
For facilities in operation these areas generally include:
plant operations (OPS), radiological controls (RADCON), maintenance
(MAINT), surveillance (SURV), emergency preparedness (EP), fire protection
(FP), security (SEC), outages (OUTG), quality programs and administrative
control s a f f e c t i ng qual i t y ( QP) , l i c ens i ng act i v i t i e s ( LI C) , and t r a i n i ng
and qualification effectiveness (TRG).
Based on a review of the consolidated information, each functional area
evaluated is placed into one of three performance categories. A Category 1
rating designates a high 1 evel of performance, a Category 2 rating
designates a satisfactory level of performance, and a Category 3 rating
designates a minimally acceptable level of performance where weaknesses are
evident, and both NRC and licensee attention should be increased.
ORAFT/8-87
SALP ratings for Maine Yankee, and the average of SALP ratings for
twenty-seven reactors operating in NRC's Region I (northeast), taken from
NRC's spring, 1987 summary of these ratings,* and NRC's subsequent Maine
Yankee SALP~ are shown below.

OPS
RADCON
MAINT
SURV
FP
EP
SEC
OUTG
QP
LIC
TRG
N:

MAINE YANKEE
9/84

MAINE YANKEE
l/86

3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
N
2
N

2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
N
2
N

MAINE YANKEE
4/87
1

2
2
1
N
1
1
N
2
2
1

NRC REG 1
3/87
1. 8
1.8
1.8
1.6
1.3
1.5
1.5
1.6
1.9
1.6
1.9

Not rated in assessment period

*"Historical Data Summary of the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance," NUREG-1214 Revision 1, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, April 1987.
ORAFT/8-87

GENERATION PRODUCTIVITY. A measure of the productivity of a power generating plant is the unit's Capacity Factor (CF), which is the ratio of total
gross power generated, in MwH, to the product of the plant's gross generating capacity and the number of hours in the period under study.
A comparison of the Capacity Factors for Maine Yankee, for eight New
England nuclear generating plants, and for all nuclear generating plants
operating in the U.S., derived from data published in Nucleonics Week, is
shown be 1ow.
NEW
MAINE
PERIOD
ENGLAND
YANKEE

u.s.

1984

59.5%

63.7%

70.1%

1985

55.2%

73.0%

73.6%

1986

56.7%

62.5%

85.4%

1987*
(Jan-Mar)

61.5%

75.4%

84.6%

*Through the end of Maine Yankee's last operating cycle.

UNPLANNED REACTOR SCRAMS.
A measure of the reliability of reactor plant
systems is the number of unplanned reactor scrams, or shutdowns, encountered per year.
A comparison of the number of unplanned scrams at Maine
Yankee, with the average number of such shutdowns at groups of similar
plants, is shown below.

PERIOD

MAINE
YANKEE

C-E
PWRs*

ALLALL
PWRs*LWRs*

1984

5

5.9

6.35.9

1985

6

7.5

6.76.0

1986

4

6.2

5.35.1

This data was derived from reports of NRC evaluations appearing in
Nuclear News, and from Maine Yankee data.
*KEY
-PWR:
Pressurized Water Reactor
C-E:
Combustion Engineering (supplier of the Maine Yankee Nuclear
Steam Supply System)
LWR:
Light Water Reactor (includes both Boiling Water Reactors and
PWRs)

SAFETY REPORTING.

Mai.ne Yankee is required

by

statute

(35-A M.R.S.A.
According to the
company's reports, "not all of the subjects covered ••• are safety related," but include reports "about non-safety aspects of safety-related equipment and systems ••• in order to provide a broad view of the operation of
Maine Yankee."
Maine Yankee listed 18 "Reportable Occurrences" in 1984, 19 in 1985,
and 8 in 1986. Summaries as reported by Maine Yankee appear on the following pages.
4334) to report safety-related incidents at the plant.

SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL. The Nuclear Waste Fund was established to
f1nance act1v1t1es under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
(the Act), Public Law 97-425.
The Act's key financial concept is that the cost to the
Federal Government of providing disposal and/or storage services
shall be fully recovered from the generators and owners of spent
nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste.
The Nuclear Waste Fund is the financing mechanism _for
DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM),
the office charged with managing the nation's nuclear waste
program in accordance with the mandates of the Act.
with DOE,
disposal
beginning
quarterly

Under the Act, nuclear utilities, through contracts
pay a one mill (one-tenth of a cent) per kilowatt hour
fee for commercial spent nuclear fuel generated
April 7, 1983.
Maine Yankee pays these fees on a
basis.

For commercial spent fuel or high-level waste generated
prior to April 7, 1983, three payment options were made available
to utilities: 1) pay in 40 quarterly installments with accrued
interest; 2) pay in a lump sum with accrued interest prior to the
first scheduled delivery of spent fuel to DOE for disposal; or 3)
pay in a lump sum prior to June 30, 1985, with no interest.
Most owners and generators of commercial spent fuel and
high-level waste, primarily utilities, chose to pay the one-time
fee by _June 30, 1985.*
Maine Yankee, however, elected to make a single payment
under the second option outlined above, and in 1983 entered into
a contract with DOE covering on-going fuel disposal cost, as well
as the accrued prior obligation of $50,367,000.
Interest on the obligation accrues at the 13-week
Treasury Bill rate compounded on a quarterly basis from April 7,
1983, through the date of the actual payment. Interest accrued
through December 31, 1986, amounted to $17,964,000. The Company
has formed a trust to provide for payment of this long-term fuel
o b1i gat i on • Fund i ng of the trust i s be i ng made by de po s i t s of
approximately $4,100,000 at least semiannually beginning December, 1985, and continuing through May, 1997, totaling

approximately $98,800,000.
The trust fund deposits plus
estimated earnings are projected to meet the total estimated
liability of $169,600,000.**
[*"OCRWM Backgrounder:
The Status of the Nuclear Waste Fund, 11
DOE/RW-0034, Office of Policy and Outreach, Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management
**Part I, Item 1-Business, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Report, Form 1, Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, Form 10-K 1986.)
t~aine Yankee has named Norstar Bank of Maine as its
trustee, and has reported that as of December 31, 1986 the
carrying value of the fund was $17,091,310.71 and the fund had a
market value of $17,664,053.24.
According to the Companyus
report, the Funds have continued to be invested in tax exempt
securities with no maturity later than January 1, 1988, and the
weighted average yield to maturity of the fund as of December 31,
1986, was 7.28%*

The Act requires an annual evaluation of the adequacy
of the one-mil per kilowatt hour fee to ensure full cost recovery
and provide for adjustment of that fee, as needed, with the
approval of Congress.
A proposal to Congress for a fee
adjustment is required only if DOE determines that an adjustment
to the on-going fee is required. To date, such an adjustment has
not been necessary. OCRWM's last evaluation** found the leO mill
per net kilowatt-hour fee adequate.
Further, the DOE Inspector General reviewed the
and practices used to compute and collect the fees due
to the Nuclear Waste Fund, to include both on-going and one-time
fees..
The I G found "adequate contro 1s exist to determine and
collect on-going fees. 11
However, some concerns were expressed
about the complete availability of funds when payment is due,
particularly in cases where utilities faced future financial
uncertainties.***
pro~edures

*Maine Yankee Report to the Governor on the Status of the Spent
Nuclear Fuel Disposal Trust Fund, February 9, 1987.
**~~Nuclear

Waste Fund Fee Adequacy: An Assessment," DOE/RW-0020
Rev., Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, June,
1987 ..

*** 11 Accuracy of Fees Paid by the Civilian Power Industry to the
Nuclear Waste Fund," DOE/IG-0231, Office of Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Energy, October 27, 1986.

SPENT FUEL STORAGE. Until the Department of Energy (DOE) accepts
spent nuclear fuel* for disposal at a Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(NWPA) facility, nuclear utilities have the primary
responsibility for the storage of their spent fuel and for the
effective use of that storage capacity.
Spent fuel assemblies
removed from nuclear reactors are stored temporarily in water
pools that cool the spent fuel rods and shield workers and others
at the site against radiation. Many of these storage pools were
intended originally for short-term storage, and their capacities
are generally limited.
A Maine statute (35-A M.R.S.A.
4371) provides that
after July 1, 1992, spent nuclear fuel may not be stored on-site
for a period exceeding three years from the date of removal of
the fuel from the reactor.
The Company has estimated that
shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the DOE will not commence
before 1998. ** Recent government-industry estimates for repository startup schedules which would trigger such shipments
project 2003 as a more likely operational date.
We cannot predict whether, or to what extent, the Maine
statute and storage capacity limitations referred to above may be
modified and whether, or to what extent, they will affect the
operation of Maine Yankee.
The statute does not explicitly
govern the operation of Maine Yankee.
The question is whether
Maine Yankee could continue to operate the generating plant if
its spent fuel facilities were in violation of the statute. The
answer to this question depends on the interpretation and
application of the statute and the constitutionally thereof.
(*Spent nuclear fuel refers to fuel that has been removed from a
nuclear reactor core primarily because it can no longer sustain
an efficient chain reaction.
High-level radioactive waste,
generated from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to extract
plutonium and the remaining usable uranium, results largely from
defense nuclear activities.
**Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Report,
Yankee Atomic Power Company, Form 10-K, 1986.)

Form 1, Maine

Under the terms of a license amendment approved by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 1984, the present storage
capacity of the spent fuel pool at Maine Yankee will be reached
in 1996, and after 1992 the available capacity of the pool would
not accommodate a full core removal.
Some nuclear utilities, faced with potential spent fuel
storage problems, have developed and subsequently obtained
approval from the NRC for various methods of extending their
on-site storage capacity.*
of fuel

One method employed by the utilities is the "reracking ..
assemblies in storage pools to obtain greater storage

MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY

REF:

Maine Yankee Event Report 86-006

On October 19, 1986, a steel beam above one of the main station output
transformers became overheated due to the failure of the normal ground path
for the generator isophase bus duct. The reactor and turbine generator were
manually tripped fr9m 92% power to prevent further equipment degradation.
Investigation revealed that the ground shunts for the normal path had been
improperly installed. Corrective actions included repairing and reinstalling
the ground shunts, inspecting the beam and ductwork for damage and inspecting
other similar shunts. All ground connections were reinspected after return to
full power and no hot spots detected.
Human health and the environment were not affected by this event.
Corrective action costs were less than two thousand dollars.

REF:

Maine Yankee Licensee Event Report 86-007

On November 15, 1986, the reactor automatically tripped from 100% power when
loss of the turbine-driven main feedwater pump tripped the main turbine. A
loose electrical connection on the feedwater pump•s main oil pump caused the
oil pump to stop. The standby oil pump did not recover control oil pressure
soon enough and the feedwater pump tripped. The loose connection was repaired
and modifications were made to the oil system to ensure the standby oil pump
will recover system pressure prior to reaching the trip setpoint.
There were no effects on human health or the environment.
The corrective action costs were less than one thousand dollars.

REF:

Maine Yankee Licensee Event Report 86-008

On December 2, 1986, a power reduction from 97% power was commenced when both
subsystems of the standby control room breathing air were declared inoperable
due to insufficient flow rate. Immediate corrective action involved removing
the internals of the inline check valve in one subsystem, increasing the flow
rate in that subsystem above the required minimum. The power reduction was
stopped at 35% power when the standby breathing air system was declared
operable. Additional corrective action involved installation of new check
valves in each subsystem. Each subsystem now provides sufficient air flow to
exceed minimum requirements.
There were no effects on human health or the environment.
The corrective action costs were less than two thousand dollars.

1220A-CDF

densities. By changing the configuration of the racks that .hold
the spent fuel in the storage pools, and by adding
neutron-absorbing material, it is possible to store more than
double the fuel than had been held in the originally designed
rae ks.
Another method is "rod consolidation," which differs
from reracking in that rod consolidation involves dismantling the
fuel assemblies in reconfigured storage racks that are designed
for higher storage densities. Rod consolidation may be done in a
storage pool, or it may be done in a dry environment.
Rod
consolidation increases the capacity of spent fuel storage pools
that have sufficient structural strength to safely support a more
compact array of spent fuel rods that have been separated from
their associated hardware components.
(*"OCRWM Backgrounder:
Cooperative Demonstration Projects for
Spent Nuclear Fuel, 11 DOE/RW-0099, Office of Policy and Outreach,
U.S. Department of Energy, September, 1986.)
In 1981, DOE successfully completed a "cold"
(non-radioactive) demonstration of prototypical rod consolidation
equipment.
In May 1983, DOE issued a solicitation for
cooperative agreement proposals for in-pool rod consolidation
demonstrations that could provide a basis for future licensing by
the NRC.
A cooperative agreement for a rod consolidation
demonstration project has been negotiated with the Northeast
Utilities Services Company of Hartford, Connecticut.
In Maine Yankee's case, the Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board has approved the company's proposal to test a consolidation
methodology which would, if implemented, permit storage capacity
through the operating life of the plant.
That implementation
would require further approval from the NRC.
A third alternative could be a dry storage method. Dry
storage systems provide a fuel storage alternative when reracking
or rod consolidation cannot be undertaken because of economic,
seismic, or structural limitations of spent fuel storage pool
systems. Systems for dry storage include casks, drywells, silos,
and vaults.
Casks are large metal containers with radiation
shielding that are stored above ground. Drywells are below-grade
wells with steel and concrete lining that are designed to hold
one or more spent fuel assemblies; the surrounding earth provides
an additional radiation barrier, as well as a medium for
conducting heat from the dry well. Silos are concrete cylinders
built above ground that provide sealed secondary containment for
spent fuel.
Vaults are large concrete structures that use
natural air convection for cool in g.
All of these dry storage
systems are designed to have low maintenance requirements and to
be modular in order to provide additional capacity as required.
However, dry storage systems demonstrated under the DOE's
auspices have never been licensed by the NRC for commercial use.
Dry storage casks with a capacity of twelve fuel assemblies have

been estimated to cost up to $2 million each, and, thus, the
economic viabiljty of this alternative has yet to be proven.
Maine Yankee received approval for a limited pilot rod
consolidation project, and has authorization to consolidate
twenty fuel assemblies on a demonstration basis.
One 8-in. by
8-in. fuel assembly has been processed under that authorization,
and the company has indicated that it plans to complete the
demonstration project prior to 1990.
The company's estimate of spent fuel pool capacity is
that it will accomodate the plant's spent nuclear fuel storage
needs until 1999.
That estimate does not assume that storage
space is available for the fuel in the plant's reactor core,
however; to maintain the capability for unloading the entire
core, know as "full core rejection" (FCR) capability, a pool
exhaust date of 1995 can be assumed.
Maine Yankee's planned rod consolidation methodology
would increase the pool's storage capacity by 60%, and, thus,
would enable the plant to extend the spent fuel pool exhaust date
past the plant's operating license expiration in 2008.
FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENT.
The April,
1986 Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union showed that a major
nuclear power plant accident could cause significant personal
injury and property damage.
At that time, the potential
financial consequences of such an accident in this country had
At the request of Senator George Mitchell,
not been assessed.
the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated what these
consequences might be and examined the need for fi nanc i a 1
protection against a nuclear accident in this country. The GAO
report* was addressed to various Congressional committees because
of the broad implications of these issues, to assist those
c omm i t tees i n rea sse s s i ng l i a bi 1 i t y protect i on pro v i de d by the
Price-Anderson Act.
Inflation has decreased the level of financial
protection originally established by that act; the $560 million
limit for commercial activities would be $2.2 billion in today's
dollars. Further, on the basis of GAO's assessment, the off-site
financial consequences of a catastrophic accident for 119
commercial plants could range from $67 million to $15.5 billion;
the consequences for Maine Yankee were estimated by GAO to be:
Estimated Property Costs:

$291

Million
Personal Injury Costs:

6

4

Million
Total Consequences:
Million

$355

*"Nuclear Regulation: A Perspective on Liability Protection for
a Nuclear Plant Accident," GAO/RCED-87-124, U.S. General
Accounting Office, June, 1987.
The Price-Anderson Act may not cover the costs of a
precautionary evacuation at an NRC licensee, however.
The act
defines a nuclear incident as an occurrence that causes damage as
a result of the radioactive properties of nuclear materials.
Confusion exists over whether the public could seek compensation
where the release of radioactive material appears imminent, such
that a precautionary evacuation is ordered, but no release
occurs.
NRC's licensees thus carry insurance to cover
precautionary evacuation costs.

CHERNOBYL.
In the past year, exhaustive studies of the April,
1986, accident at the Soviet Union's Chernobyl-4 nuclear power
station have been conducted, with the international scientific
community seeking to identify any lessons which could be learned
from that accident for improving nuclear plant safety.
Conclusions which have been drawn are similar, but
recommendations based on those conclusions vary widely.
As the Soviet report prepared for the International
Atomic Energy Agency stated:
"The accident at Chernobyl' was the result of
coincidences of several events of low
probability."*
Most published assessments concur with that statement, and go on
to attribute specific causes of the accident to system design, and also to
operator and procedural error.
*"The Accident at the Chernobyl' AES and its Consequences," U.S.S.R. State
Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, August, 1986.
SYSTEM DESIGN.
The accident at Chernobyl-4 involved a Soviet-designed
high-power, graphite-moderated boiling-water-cooled reactor, identified as
an RBMK-1000 system. According to compendium of U.S. assessments,* this
uniquely Soviet design evolved from early demonstration and plutonium production reactors. General characteristics of the RBMK and its predecessors
include the use of graphite as a neutron moderator and light water as the
coolant. Pressure tubes, contained in vertical channels in the graphite,
either contain low-enriched uranium oxide fuel or are used as locations for
control rods and instrumentation.
The use of boiling water as a coolant in a pressure-tube, graphitemoderated reactor distinguishes the RBMK design from any other reactor
design. Other distinguishing features of the RBMK design include:
on-line refueling
single uranium enrichment level
separation of core cooling into independent halves
use of computerized control systems
separate flow control for each pressure tube
pos i t i ve vo i d rea c t i v i t y co e f f i c i en t s under most opera t i ng
conditions
slow scram system
steam suppression system
programmed power setbacks (rather than scrams) for various
abnormal conditions
low coolant-to-fuel ratio

accident localization system
*"Report on the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, .. NUREG1250, Department of Energy/Electric Power Reseach Institute/Environmental
Protection Agency/Federal Emergency Management Agency/Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations/Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January, 1987.

Chernobyl Unit 4 was one of 14 operating RBMK-1000 reactor plants.
Significant differences exist in RBMK-1000 designs, as they have evolved
from the early Leningrad design (first-generation RBMK, eight total units)
to the more modern Smolensk design (second-generation RBMK, six total
units, including Chernobyl Units 3 and 4).
This evolution of the RBMK
design is often difficult to discern in Soviet literature, and details of
the plant-specific differences among the 14 plants are not available.
However, descriptive material of second-generation RBMK-1000 reactors is
more complete, especially as a result of information in the Soviet report
on the accident.
OPERATOR AND PROCEDURAL ERROR. Chronologies of the Chernobyl-4 accident
reveal a number of operata~ and procedural errors which contributed to the
ace i dent, which occurred during the performance of a turbine generator
test. The test procedures had not been adequately reviewed from a safety
standpoint.
Management control of the performance of the test was- not
maintained; the test procedure was not followed; safety systems were bypassed; and control rods were operated incorrectly. Operators lost control
of the reactor during the performance of the test.
Information available indicates that Chernobyl Unit 4 was one of the
best of the 14 operating RBMK-1000 units. The training and experience of
the operating crew may have focused mainly on steady-state operation since
the reactor operated continually as a base-loaded unit with on-line refueling.
Evidently, very little, if any, training had been conducted on a
plant simulator. Only one simulator at another site has been mentioned as
possibly serving the training needs of operators of all RBMK units.
The U.S. review concluded that the previous excellent performance
created an attitude in plant personnel that close adherence to procedures
was unnecessary; in effect, the previous trouble-free operation led to a
dominating overconfidence.
The RBMK units had accumulated more than 100 reactor-years of operation. Chernobyl Unit 4 had been in operation two years. It is not known
what events had occurred at RBMK units that may have been precursors to the
April, 1986, accident or what corrective actions had been taken in the
areds of design, operations, or training.
AN INDUSTRY VIEW. The Atomic Industrial Forum, which refers to itself as
11
the association of the nuclear industry," stated in an annual overview of
the state of that industry:*

Chernobyl was the ultimate civilian nuclear disaster:
It
resulted in total destruction of a power reactor, widespread
distribution of radioactive materials over a broad area of the
globe, prompt fatalities (31), and the possibility of future
health effects. The accident raised questions in the minds of
public officials, and triggered a review of emergency procedures as well as a new look at some U.S. containment systems.
In many countries, including the United States, Chernobyl was
cited by some as a reason to close or delay startup of nuclear
power plants.
AIF concluded, however, that 11 both the design characteristics of the
Chernobyl-type reactor and the procedures fo 11 owed by its operators
cornbine~d to create a situation that would not be duplicated anywhere else
in the world." The AIF statement continued by quoting the Association's
President, Carl Walske.
Ac co r d i n g to Wa 1 s ke , 11 Che r no by 1 en t e r s t he hi s to r y boo ks as the
accident that proved the basic correctness of nuclear power design and
operating decisions made in the West more than two decades ago. The major
lessons of Chernobyl are to be learned by the Soviets."

* " The Nuc 1e a r I nd us t r y i n 198 6 :

A Yea r of I nco n g r u i t i e s , 11 I nf o News Re lease, Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., December 12, 1986.

H~PLICATIONS OF THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT.
Conclusions being drawn about
c au s e s of the a c c i dent at Chern o by 1 - 4 i n April , 198 6 , po i, nt to ma na gem en t
and administrative control breakdown, operator errors, procedural and
training deficiencies, equipment and system design inadequacies, and equipment fa i 1u res.

Compounding factors were inattentiveness, low levels of diligence, and
overconfidence by responsible personnel, who tended to trust previous
experience rather than carefully-developed procedure.
Additionally, the simultaneous occurrence of a number of these factors
was unanticipated or unforeseen in the development of planning scenarios on
which Chernobyl~4 operations were based.
Apart from any arguable technological similarities between Chernobyl-4
and U.S. nuclear plants, the conceptual problems stated above unquestionably have some parallel outside the Chernobyl-4 experience.
For example, the following inadequacies were identified
investigation* of the Three Mile Island 2 accident in March, 1979:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

in

an

Equipment performance (failures and maloperation).
Transient and accident analyses.
Operator training and performance.
Equipment and system design.
Information flow, particularly during the early hours of
the accident.
Implementation of emergency planning.

* 11 Investigation into the i~arch 29, 1979, Three Mile Island Accident by
Office of Inspection and Enforcement, 11 Investigative Report No. 50-320/
79-10, NUREG-0600, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August, 1979.

The investigative report continued:
Perhaps the most disturbing result of the IE investigation
i s con f i rm at i on of e a r 1 i e r con c 1us i on s that t he Th r e e Mi 1 e
Island Unit 2 accident could have been prevented, in spite of
the inadequacies listed. Th~~ design of the plant, the equipment that was installed, the various accident and transient
analyses, and the emergency procedures were adequate to have
prevented the serious consequences of the accident, if they had
been permitted to function or be carried out as planned.
For
example, had the operators allowed the emergency core cooling
system to perform its intended function, damage to the core
would most 1 ikely have been prevented.
There are other
examples set forth in the report where, had a particular operator action been taken, the consequences of the accident could
On the other hand, had
have been significantly mitigated.

certain equipment been designed differently, it too, could have
prevented or reduced the consequences of the ace i dent.
The
results of the investigation make it difficult to fault only
the actions of the operating staff..
There is considerable
evidence of a "mind set," not only by TMI operators but by
operators at other plants as well, that overfilling the reactor
coolant system (making the system solid) was to be avoided at
a l most any cost •
Undue at tent i on by the TM I o pe r a to r s to
avoiding a solid system led them to ignore other procedural
instructions and indications that the core was not being
properly cooled. Without this "mind set" they might well have
acted to preclude or better mitigate the accident.
The accidents at Chernobyl-4 and Three Mile Island 2 cannot be dismissed as totally unrelated. A pattern of system failure recurs in these
accidents; the pattern extends to non-nuclear facilities, as well. To cite
a memorable example, on July 13, 1977, the entire electric load of the Con
Edison system was lost. New York City and Westchester County were plunged
into darkness.
Electric service to more than 8 million ,people in the
metro po 1 i tan a rea and to the comm e r c i a 1 and i nd us t r i a 1 users of t h i s a rea
was interrupted for periods from 5 to 25 hours.
Although there was no
direct loss of life, the economic losses were very large, in part because
of extensive looting and malicious property damage.
The collapse of the Con Edison System resulted from a
combination of natural events, equipment malfunctions, questionable system design features, and operating errors.
Of
paramount importance, however, was the lack of preparation for
major emergencies such that operating personnel failed to use
the facilities at hand to prevent a system-wide failure. Even
after the loss of major transmission facilities, a complete
system shutdown could and should have been prevented by a timely increase in Con Edison's in-city generation or by manual
load shedding.*
The FERC report went on to identify failures in management responsibility; selection, training, and supervision of system operators; system
planning, design and operations; equipment inspection and testing, and
general preparations for a major emergency.
Clearly evident in reports of all three of these incidents (Chernobyl4 in April, 1986; Three Mile Island 2 in March, 1979; and Con Edison of New
York in July, 1977) is the recurrence of the same generic failures,
accompanied by recommendations and cautions that these failures be addressed in future operations throughout the power industries. The reappearance
of these same factors in later, and progressively more serious, situations
seems to indicate that the required lessons may have not been learned.
*"The Con Edison Power Failure of July 13, and 14, 1977," Final
Report, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, June, 1978.
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FEDERAL PREEMPTION.
One complication of the extension of experience, or
lessons learned, .. to improve safety or efficiency at nuclear power stations is federal preemption, which in some critical areas removes state
officials from direct jurisdiction over, or perhaps even knowledge of,
safety matters. A member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission during the
Three Mile Island 2 incident has described this dilemma:
11

"The consequences of the preemption of the states from
nuclear safety decision-making came home to roost in the aftermath of Three Mile Island •••• At the point at which the
federal regulators and the utility were confounded by puzzling
and dangerous events, 0 Pennsylvania's§ Governor Thornburgh was
called upon to make the first nuclear power plan·t safety decision ever entrusted to a state official - whether or not to
evacuate the surrounding population. 11 *
I n t h i s res pe c t i t may be noted that the Ma i ne Leg i s 1at u r e recent 1Y
enacted legislation creating a State program for the monitoring of safety
at t~aine Yankee. P.L. 1987,. c. 519 (AN ACT To Establish a State Nuclear
Safety Inspection and Monitoring Program for Commercial Nuclear Pov1er
Facilities in the State).

* Where Ignorant Armies Clash by Night -- Relations-hips Among Nuclear Regu11

lators and Regulated, .. Address by Peter A. Bradford, Chairman, Maine Public
Utilities Commission, to the Nuclear Plant Safety and Reliability Seminar,
Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, January 22, 1987.

DECOMMISSIONING.
In 1982, the Nuclear Decommission Financing Act was
en a c ted , i n whi c h the Ma i ne Leg i s 1at u re found t ha t " t i me 1y proper dec omm i s sioning ••• is essential to protect public health, safety, and the environment and that the cost of decommissioning will be significant. 35-A
M.R.S.A. 4351 (1). The Legislature also found "that assurance is needed
that funds will be available for the cost of decommissioning which would
occur if a nuclear power plant is prematurely closed."
35-A M.R.S.A.
4351 ( 6).
11

The NRC current 1y recognizes three decommissioning methods - camp 1ete
dismantling and removal, in-place encapsulation or "entombment" and mothballing - or a combination of these methods. Maine Yankee currently proposes to use the complete dismantling and removal method.
Through 1986,
the Company had collected $13,303,324 for decommissioning costs in accordance with FERC orders approving settlements issued in 1982 and 1985. The
Company began collecting annual decommissioning charges of $1,826,100
beginning December 7, 1981.
Subsequently, a FERC order increased the
allowed decommissioning charge to an annual level of $4,000,000 (exclusive
of any income tax liability), effective January 15, 1985. The $4,000,000
was based on the approach of escalating, rather than level, collections
over the operating life of the plant.*
On June 19, 1987, a FERC order approved a Maine Yankee proposal

to

i nc rea s e dec omm i s s i on i ng c ha r ge s to an ann ua 1 1eve 1 of $4 , 796 , 000, d ue to

increases in waste disposal costs at the Chem-Nuclear burial facility in
Barnwell, South Carolina; these additional payments to the Decommissioning
Trust Fund began on June 1, 1987.

*Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Report, Form 1, Year 1986 - Maine
Yankee Atomic Power Company, Form 10-K - 1986.
The Decommissioning Fund balance as of December 31, 1986, was
$15,041,736 (including interest earned).
The fund is maintained in the
Maine National Bank.
The 1982 Maine statute (35-A r~.R.S.A.
4353) requires the Company to
s u bm i t a de t a i 1e d dec omm i s s i o n i ng f i na nc i ng p1an to t he Pu b1 i c Ut i 1 i t i e s
Commission for approval~
The Company completed the fi 1 ing of its decommissioning financing plan on January 18, 1984. In that plan, a study, done
in 1983 and adjusted in 1984, estimated decommissioning costs of
$115,467,000 (in 1983 dollars).

In March, 1986, Staff Participants in the 1986 Maine Yankee Shutdown
As s e s s men t e s t i ma ted dec omrn i s s i on i ng co s t s at $ 200 , 000 , 000 ( i n 198 6 do l l a r s ) f o r d i s rna nt l i ng a nd f u l l dec omm i s s i on i n g o f t he pl a nt •
Cu r r e nt
industry estimates for a plant such as Maine Yankee would likely be in the
range of $190,000,000 to $210,000,000 for the same decommissioning option.
Maine Yankee has stated its intent to update its decommissioning study
and reevaluate the adequacy of the annual charge by the end of 1987.
Some uncertainties persist in factors which comprise decommissioning
cost analyses, however. NRC has still to release its revised Decommissioning Criteria for Nuclear Facilities, initially proposed in February, 1985.
The State's future situation as of the January 1, 1983 deadline of the
LLRWPA (at which time the State assumes direct responsibility for all
low-level waste in Maine) is uncertain.
The future readiness of DOE to accept high-level waste shipments as of
1998 is questionable.
As a result of these uncertainties, the timing of any Maine Yankee
dec omm i s s i on i ng , wh i c h of ne cess i t y mus t awa i t s i t e s for 1ow- 1e ve 1 a n d
high-level waste, is difficult to project. Indeed, Maine Yankee may become
an interim high-level waste and spent fuel repository, as well as a
low-level waste site, for an indefinite period, depending on developments
in these areas and the effect of 35-A M.R.S.A. 4371 (discussed earlier).
Although not a preferred or even desirable method, long term on site waste
management has been reviewed by Maine Yankee.*
Industry experience is rapidly evolving and is scheduled for review in
an International Decommissioning Symposium in October.
This session,
sponsored by DOE, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Nuclear
Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
is a follow-up to a DOE symposium in 1982.
The ~1PUC Staff plans to be
represented at the October symposium.
Finally, with respect to the Legislative finding, 35-A M.R.S.A.
4356 (6) provides that "assurance is needed that funds will be available
for the cost of decommissioning which would occur if a nuclear power plant
is prematurely closed," and 35-A M.R.S.A.
4356 (3) provides that if the
Decommissioning Trust Fund is insufficient to decommission the plant, the
licensee would be responsible for the deficiency, but if the Company were
unable to provide the full amount, the statute provides that owners would
be jointly and severally responsible for the balance.
A number of resource documents, representing a wide range of Maine
Yankee decommissioning topics, has been compiled and is available at the
Public Utilities Commission Information Resource Center; a partial listing
of these resources appears on the following pages.
*"In-Site Decommissioning/Low-Level Waste Management Topical Report,":
APTR-42, Ebasco Services, Inc. for Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company,
January, 1987.

MPUC RESOURCES - MAINE YANKEE DECOMMISSIONING
1.

"Final Safety Analysis Report -Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station,"
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, August 1970

2.

"Final Environmental Statement Related to Operation of Maine Yankee
Atomic Power Station," Directorate of Licensing, U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission, July 1972

3.

"Termination of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Reactors," Regulatory
Guide 1.86, Directorate of Regulatory Standards, U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission, June 1974

4.

"Potential Radiation Dose to Man from Recycle of Metals Reclaimed from
a Decommissioned Nuclear Power Plant," NUREG/CR-0134 and ORNL/NUREG/
TM-215, Oak Ridge National Laboratory for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, December 1978

5.

"Plan for Reevaluation of NRC Policy on Decommissioning of Nuclear
Facilities," NUREG-0436 Rev. 1, Office of Standards Development, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 1978

6.

"Technology, Safety and Costs of Decommissioning a Reference Pressurized Water Reactor Power Station," NUREG/CR-0130, Battelle Pacific
Northwest Laboratory for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June
1978; Addendum, August 1979

7.

"Decommissioning Commercial Nuclear Facilities: A Review and Analysis
of Current Regulations," NUREG/CR-0671, Pacific Northwest Laboratory
and Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 1979

8.

"Decontamination and Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities," Marilyn
M. Osterhout, ed.; Proceedings of the American Nuclear Society topical
meeting in Sun Valley, Idaho, September 16-20, 1979

9.

"Residual Radioactivity Limits for Decommissioning - Draft Report,"
NUREG-0613, Office qf Standards Development, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, October 1979

10. "Assuring the Availability of Funds for Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities
Draft Report," NUREG-0584 Rev. 1, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 1979
11. "Thoughts on Regulation Changes for Decommissioning - Draft Report,"
NUREG-0590 Rev. 1, Office of Standards Development, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, December 1979
12. "Financing Strategies for Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning," NUREG/
CR-1481, New England Conference of Public Utilities Commissioners,
Inc./Temple, Barker & Sloan, Inc. for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1980
13. "A Methodology for Calculating Residual Radioactivity Levels Following
Decommissioning," NUREG-0707, Office of Standards Development, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 1980
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14. "Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of
Nuclear Facilities," NUREG-0586, Office of Standards Development, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 1981
15. "Decontamination Processes for Restorative Operations and as a Precursor to Decommissioning:
A Literature Review," NUREG/CR-1915 and
PNL-3706
lD, WD, Pacific Northwest Laboratory for U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, May 1981
16. "Monitoring for Compliance with Decommissioning Termination Survey
Criteria,"
NUREG/CR-2082
and
ORNL/HASRD-95, Oak Ridge National
Laboratory for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1981
17. "Technology and Cost of Termination Surveys Associated with Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities," NUREG/CR-2441 and ORNL/HASRD-121, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
February 1982
18. "The Impacts of Early Retirement of Nuclear Power Plants: The Case of
Maine Yankee," ESRG 82-91, Energy Systems Research Group, Inc., August
1982
19. "The Decommissioning
Agency, August 1982

of

Nuclear Plants," International Atomic Energy

20. "Funding Nuclear Power Plant
Regulatory Research Institute
1982

Decommissioning," 82-3, The National
for U.S. Department of Energy, October

21. "Assuring the Availability of Funds for Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities: Draft Report," NUREG-0584 Rev. 3, Office of State Programs, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 1983
22. "An Overview of Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants," Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., March 1983
23. "Decommissioning of Nuclear Generating Stations: A Policy Statement
of the American Nuclear Society, 11 ANS Document PPS-13, American
Nuclear Society, May 1983
24. "Effects on Decommissioning of Interim Inability to Dispose of Wastes
Offsite," Addendum 2 to NUREG/CR-0130, Pacific Northwest Laboratory
for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1983
25. "Decommissioning Cost Estimate for the Maine Yankee Atomic Power
Station,'' M01-25-001-1, TLG Engineering, Inc. for Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Company, October 1983 [MPUC 82-179/MYAPCO: EXH LAGUARDIA-!]
26. "Decommissioning," a compendium of articles, Critical
Project and Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 1984

Mass Energy

27. "Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning Study for the Yankee Nuclear
Power Station," Yankee Atomic Electric Company, April 1984
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28. "Utility Financial Stability and the Availability of Funds for Decommissioning," NUREG/CR-3899, Engineering and Economics Research, Inc.
for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 1984
29. "Classification of Decommissioning Wastes," Addendum 3 to NUREG/CR0130,
Pacific
Northwest Laboratory for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, September 1984
30. "Comments on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Proposed Rule on
Decommissioning," Michael Totten, Director, Public Citizen's Critical
Mass Energy Project and on behalf of Environmental Action Foundation,
September 1984
31. "Evaluation of Nuclear Facility Decommissioning Projects -- Annual
Summary Report
Fiscal Year 1984," NUREG/CR-4090, UNC Nuclear
Industries for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 1985
32. "Decommissioning Criteria for Nuclear Facilities," Proposed
FR50:28:5600, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 1985

Rule,

33. "Dismantling the Myths about Nuclear Decommissioning," Sally Hindman,
Public Citizen/Environmental Action, April 1985
34. "Updated Costs for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Facilities,'" EPRI
NP-4012, Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories for Electric Power
Research Institute, May 1985
35. "Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning Study for Millstone Unit No. 3,"
Northeast Utilities Service Company, June 1985
36. "Decommissioning:
Nuclear Power's Missing Link," Worldwatch Paper 69,
Cynthia Pollock for Worldwatch Institute, April 1986
37. "Maine Yankee Shutdown Assessment:
A Report to Governor Joseph E.
Brennan,"
Maine
State
Planning
Office/Maine Office of Energy
Resources/Maine Public Advocate, May 1986
38. "Maine Yankee Shutdown Assessment: Staff Papers and Correspondence,"
Maine State Planning Office/Maine Office of Energy Resources/Maine
Public Advocate, May 1986
39. "Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities: Feasibility, Needs and Costs_"
Nuclear Energy Agency, Organisation for Economic Co-operation.and
Development August 1986
40. "Nuclear Reactor Decommissioning:
An
Environments," ORNL/TM-9638, Oak Ridge
Department of Energy, August 1986

Analysis of the Regulatory
National Laboratory for U.S.

41. "Report," Interstate (Mass., Me., N.H., Vt.) Task Group on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities, September 1986
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42: "Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station In-Site Decommissioning/Low Level
Waste Management Topical Report," APTR-42, Ebasco Services, Inc. for
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, January 1987
43. "Decommissioning Study for the Connecticut Yankee Automic Power Company Nuclear Generating Station," Northest Utilities Service Company,
March 1987
44. "Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station: LLW Conversion Study," Preliminary
Draft, TLG Engineering, Inc. for Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company,
March 1987
45. "A Technology Assessment Methodology for Electric Utility Planning:
With Application to Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning," W. Timothy
Lough for Virginia State Corporation Commission, May 1987
46. "Waste Management for Shippingport Station Decomrnissioning Project:
Extended Summary," CONT-870306--12-Summ., General Electric Company
Nuclear Energy Business Operations for U.S. D~partment of Energy, July
1987
47. "Reference Guide to the Funding and Taxation Aspects of Nuclear Decommissioning," National Association of Regulation Utility Commissoners,
August 1987
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